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In the first part of this article .82 I described the circumstances
surrounding the adoption by the first Congress of the excessive bail
clause of the eighth amendment and traced its antecedents in both
colonial and English history. The historical evidence showed that
preconstitutional protection against pretrial imprisonment rested not
only on a proscription against excessive bail but, more importantly,
upon statutory provisions fixing the right to bail and guaranteeing
through habeas corpus an effective and speedy remedial procedure.
The ambiguity of the eighth amendment was traced to the fact that
the Constitution, while preserving habeas corpus and prohibiting excessive bail, failed to provide explicitly for the underlying right to
bail which the other clauses served to implement. This failure was
ascribed to the inadvertent draftsmanship of George Mason, and it was
concluded that the only reading of the eighth amendment consistent
with Mason's purpose to provide "effectual securities for

.

.

.

essential

rights" reveals a right to bail secure against both legislative and
judicial abridgement. While such an interpretation leaves unresolved
the precise scope of the right and its possible limitation in extreme
* This is the second part of Professor Foote's article, the first part of which
appeared in the May issue. Footnote and subdivision numbers continue from the final
footnote and subdivision numbers in Part I.
t Professor of Law and Criminology, University of California at Berkeley.
182 Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. Rxv. 959-99
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Crisis in Bail: 1].
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situations, the alternative is to reduce the amendment to surplusage and
to disregard (1) the important role of bail as a fundamental right in
the development of English liberty following Magna Carta; (2) the
nondiscretionary character of contemporary English and colonial bail
law; (3) the significant trends in colonial legislation which went far beyond English law in their liberality and excluded judicial discretion in
determining the right to bail; and (4) the objective of the Bill of
Rights to protect against congressional abuse.
From the assumption that the eighth amendment establishes the
right to bail, I proceeded to examine the constitutional standard of
what constitutes "excessive" bail for indigent defendants and concluded that existing interpretations which exclude the poor from pretrial release are seriously out of step with current constitutional
concern for the poor. These interpretations derived from an era
which had no more regard for the rights of paupers generally than
for the narrower problems posed by the indigence of many criminal
defendants. This conflict between an historically derived discrimination and a growing thrust towards equal protection led to the prediction
that major constitutional problems in the relationship of indigents to
the bail system are in the offing, and it is to these problems that I
now turn.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION OF A BAIL CASE

The precise nature of the constitutional dilemma in bail is best
illustrated by examination of an example. Accordingly I will put a
hypothetical case which poses in perhaps their most difficult form the
issues which must be faced in reaching a resolution of the pretrial
detention problem. The hypothetical case will then be analyzed in
light of our previous discussion of the extent of the constitutional
right to bail and the rights of a pauper against "excessive" bail.
Finally, the constitutional scheme will be contrasted with a possible
alternative system of preventive pretrial detention whose operation is
based on the application of standards of dangerousness applied to rich
and poor alike.
A. The Hypothetical Case
About 3:10 a.m. on Sunday morning a robbery occurred at an
all-night service station in a large, northeastern city. The sole attendant on duty, Allen, was waiting on a customer, Williams, as the
robber's car drove up and the driver got out. After Williams left and
Allen went over to the robber's car, the robber suddenly lunged at
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him, knocking off his glasses and pressing the open blade of a small
knife against his stomach. The robber forced Allen to give him 130
dollars from the cash register and, before leaving, also took two new
Atlas tires and an electric lantern from displays in the station. Allen,
who had very poor vision without his glasses, could only describe his
assailant as a Negro of medium build and height, age about 25.
Another customer, Watson, who arrived as the robber drove away,
was able to describe the car as an old, dark, two-door sedan. Watson
could not state the car's make and did not obtain the registration
number, but he did note that it carried Virginia plates.
Late the next afternoon (Monday) an alert police officer, who
had read about the foregoing facts in a police circular and who was on
duty on Grand Avenue, in a lower class Negro district, noticed an
old two-door black sedan with Virginia plates illegally parked on a
garage lot, partially blocking the sidewalk. When he investigated he
saw two very new Atlas tires mounted on the rear wheels. The officer
asked the garage operator, Inman, about the car and tires. Inman
stated the car belonged to a man named Daniels, who had mounted
the tires himself the day before and "had acted kind of suspicious." As
another man approached, Inman volunteered, "There's Daniels now."
The officer called Daniels over and asked Inman, "Is this the man?"
Receiving an affirmative reply, the officer questioned Daniels about his
ownership of the car, his whereabouts the night of the robbery and his
acquisition of the tires. He received answers he regarded as evasive
and unsatisfactory, including the assertion that Daniels had possessed
the tires "for about a week." When the officer noticed an electric
lantern on the back shelf of the car, he took Daniels into custody. A
search produced forty-two dollars in cash and a small pocket knife; a
check of the tires and lantern showed them to be of the same variety
as those stolen from the service station. The attendant, Allen, was
unable to identify the defendant.
On Tuesday morning after a preliminary hearing defendant was
ordered held for the grand jury on a charge of armed robbery and
committed to jail in default of 2,500 dollars bail. On Thursday a
white man, Williams, came to the police station and identified himself
as one of the customers who had been in the service station at 3:10
a.m. on Sunday. He said he had just learned of the robbery, that he had
had a good look at the robber when he drove up as the attendant was
servicing his car and that he thought he could identify him. The
police obtained an order enabling them to get defendant from the
county jail in order to parade him in a line-up at which Williams picked
him out as the man he had seen at the service station.
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On the following Monday the defendant Daniels was interviewed
by an attorney from Legal Aid. Defendant complained that he had
asked to see a Legal Aid lawyer repeatedly over the past week, but the
lawyer explained that Legal Aid did not have the staff to represent
all defendants at preliminary hearing and that this was the first
opportunity they had had to see him. In response to the lawyer's
inquiry about how he was being treated, defendant complained bitterly
about "lousy" food, being locked in a cell eighteen hours a day, and
having been given a "going over" by the police for an hour the
previous Thursday. He explained that he had been taken from the
jail and put in a line-up, after which "three or four of them" had
questioned him for about an hour. He said that they had been trying
to get a confession but that he "knew his rights" and refused to talk.
He also said that he was not physically abused.
At the lawyer's reqiest defendant briefly described his background, stating that he was twenty-six years old and had been born
and raised in Virginia, where his parents rented a small farm. He
admitted that he had previously been convicted once each for vagrancy,
drunkenness, disorderly conduct, theft and assault, and had served
two short jail sentences. He had left Virginia in his car about a year
ago, had stayed in several other cities where he had had occasional
jobs and in one of which he had served one of his sentences, and had
arrived in this city three weeks ago. After staying a few days with
a sister who had come here a few years ago and whom he hadn't seen
for years, he had moved to a rooming house. He had obtained several
days' work as a day laborer and on the day of his arrest had found a
job at a car wash and was just returning from his first day's work
when he was apprehended. His only assets were his clothing, a cheap
radio in his room, and the money and car which the police had confiscated. Asked about the electric lantern, he explained that he had
purchased it in Cincinnati three months previously.
On the Saturday before the robbery he said he was dead broke
and tried to borrow ten dollars from his sister, who didn't have it to
lend him. That afternoon he had been with a fellow whom he knew
only as Joe; they had gotten into a crap game with a group of other
men he did not know but some of whom he could probably find; luck
was with him and he had won over one hundred dollars. Early in
the evening he visited his sister and gave her thirty dollars from his
winnings. Around 11:00 Saturday night he was in a Grand Avenue
tavern and met a girl he could identify only as Jo Ann but whom he
would certainly know -if he saw her again. About midnight he went
with Jo Ann to her room nearby; by that time he was quite drunk,
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but he knew generally, within a block or two, where the room was.
He was with Jo Ann until midmorning on Sunday and when he left,
went to get his car, only to find he had two flat tires. The tires were
so old as to be hardly worth repair, and while he was contemplating
his predicament a man whom he had seen before and whose name
might be Charlie approached him and asked him if he would like to
buy two new tires cheap. Defendant purchased two Atlas tires from
Charlie for fifteen dollars, asking no questions as to how Charlie had
obtained them. He stated that the reason he had lied to the officer
about how long he had had the tires was because he suspected there
might be something fishy about the transaction. Defendant described
Charlie as a Negro, age about twenty-five to thirty, about five feet ten
and 170 pounds, with a small moustache. He then went to the garage
operated by Inman, whom he knew slightly, and borrowed the necessary tools to mount the tires. He said he was mad at Inman for getting him into trouble by identifying him to the arresting officer and
by what Inman had told the officer. "If he'd kept his mouth shut, I
wouldn't be here."
The attorney was sufficiently impressed by the defendant's demeanor and possible innocence to make special arrangements to have
a Legal Aid investigator sent immediately to the Grand Avenue
neighborhood where defendant lived to try to check out his story. The
investigator reported that he had found defendant's sister, who was
unmarried, pregnant and had two small children; she was living on
welfare and unable to help defendant financially; she confirmed that
defendant had first tried to borrow money from her on Saturday and
later, "about ten" that evening, had given her thirty dollars. He
verified defendant's rooming house and his employment at the car
wash, where someone else had been hired to replace him after he failed
to show for work on two successive days. He also located Inman's
garage and confirmed the account of the tire-mounting episode on
Sunday, but he was unable to find any trace of Joe, Jo Ann or Charlie.
When later informed of this last fact by the attorney, defendant exclaimed: "Those people won't talk to you, man. Get me out of here
and I'll find them."
B. A Note on Strategy
The hypothetical defendant is typical of the many urban accused
who are bad bail risks by any of the orthodox standards. He has no
money, no ties to the community, no respectable local relatives, and a
prior criminal record. He represents the cases which are not likely to
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be helped by reforms such as the Vera Foundation's Manhattan Bail
But his story also
Project, which deal in relatively good risks."8
illustrates the fact that such a person may not be guilty of the particular crime with which he is charged. His defense at trial will have
to turn on his own credibility and his ability to produce alibi witnesses. The case thus poses three major problems of bail in indigent
cases: pretrial punishment of a defendant who may not be guilty, the
possibly critical importance in the trial of a close case of any contamination of the adjudicatory process which may result from a defendant's jail status, and special circumstAnces which may impair the
right to prepare a defense.
The threshold problem for counsel for the hypothetical defendant
is to determine what procedure can be employed for immediate relief
from pretrial detention. A combination of factual circumstances and
rules of procedure has made it very difficult to obtain effective review
of alleged excessive bail. Counsel could use the state courts to attack
the bail amount by habeas corpus or motion, alleging that any financial
demand upon an indigent constitutes constitutionally excessive bail.
This immediately brings one up against rules created to insulate the
original determination of the amount of bail from attack. A so-called
presumption against interfering with the discretion of the court originally setting bail 18 requires the defendant to assume the burden of
showing a flagrant abuse which shocks the court, 8 5 and some courts
even examine the amount of bail in the context of a further presumption
183 Crisis in Bail: I, at 961. In Short v. United States, 344 F.2d 549 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (per curiam), bail was denied pending appeal. Short's record was more
favorable for release than that of the hypothetical defendant-for example, he would
"reside with relatives in the District of Columbia and he will be employed by a
former employer." Id. at 550. (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). But pending trial The
District of Columbia Bail Project, similar to the Vera Manhattan Bail Project,
"which has been of great help to our courts in such matters, looked into the matter
of his possible release on personal recognizance . . . and found he did not qualify
for such release under the criteria of the Project." Id. at 550. (Fahy, J., concurring).
184 See, e.g., Gusick v. Boies, 72 Ariz. 233, 233 P.2d 446 (1951). For an extreme
case see State v. Kjelstad, 230 Wis. 579, 284 N.W. 554 (1939), where after original
release on $1,500 bail defendant was rearrested on motion of the district attorney,
and bail was increased to $5,000. In the supreme court the district attorney sought
to uphold the increase by arguing that it was designed to protect defendant from
mob violence. The court said this would constitute an improper basis for detention
but that, as the argument did not appear in the record, relief would be denied because
of the presumption that the court below had proper reasons.
185 Ex parte Morehead, 107 Cal. App. 2d 346, 237 P.2d 335 (1951) (must appear
per se that amount fixed clearly disproportionate); EX parte Duncan, 53 Cal. 410
(1879) (amount must "shock the common sense") ; Reid v. Perkerson, 207 Ga. 27,
60 S.E.2d 151 (1950) (must be flagrant) ; Delaney v. Shobe, 218 Ore. 626, 346 P.2d
126 (1959) (must show clear abuse). Compare Noto v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct.
255, 257 (Harlan, Circuit Justice, 1955) ("Ordinarily I would be unwilling to disturb
the action of the two courts below in a matter of this kind") ; Mastrian v. Hedman,
326 F.2d 708, 711 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964) (in federal habeas
corpus proceeding, amount set in state court must be shown to be "beyond the range
within which judgments could rationally differ . . .").
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that for this purpose the defendant is assumed to be guilty.""8 In one
case where an appellate judge thought that bail in half the amount set
would have been sufficient to secure the defendant's appearance, it was
held that the lower court's action was not sufficiently arbitrary or
capricious to warrant relief. 8" These rules, coupled with the factors
of time, poverty, obstacles to obtaining an original setting of bail."m
and the uncertainty of being able to obtain actual release even if a bail
reduction case is won on appeal 18 probably account for the fact that
about half the American jurisdictions have no reported cases dealing
with allegedly excessive bail. Of course many bail reduction cases are
unreported, but the inference is strong that present procedures for
obtaining relief from an original determination of allegedly excessive
bail are grossly inadequate.
The state court system, moreover, is almost certain to be relatively unsympathetic to novel federal constitutional claims, and access
to a federal forum is of great importance. But if we are dealing with
a typical jurisdiction, jail cases are expedited on the calendar and
within thirty to fifty days of arrest the defendant will be brought to
trial, thereby mooting pretrial procedures for relief. This time squeeze
is almost certain to prevent exhaustion of the state appellate system in
time to obtain review in the United States Supreme Court.190
18
Ex parte Ryan, 44 Cal. 555 (1872) (assuming defendant is guilty, is bail
too high?); Ex parte Malley, 50 Nev. 248, 256 Pac. 512 (1927); E parte McWhorter, 48 Okla. Crim. 397, 292 Pac. 393 (1930). But see Gusick v. Boies, 72
Ariz.18233,
233 P2d 446 (1951) (presumed innocent).
7
Braden v. Lady, 276 S.W2d 664 (Ky. 1955) (bail pending appeal). Fifteen
months after reduction was refused Braden's conviction was reversed and the indictment dismissed, Braden v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1956).
188 See, e.g., Foote, Markle & Wooley, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia,102 U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1032-43 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Philadelphia Bail Study]; Note, A Study of the Administration of
Bail it New York City, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 693, 699-703 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as New York Bail Study]. In Ex parte Stegman, 112 N.J. Eq. 72, 83, 163 Atl.
422, 427 (1932), the court found "as a fact" that bail had been refused because "the
quarter sessions was co-operating with the prosecutor . . . to hold petitioners in
confinement in order to obtain confessions by oppressive means . .. ."
189A defendant held in $5,000 bail who succeeded in getting a very substantial
reduction to $1,500 would only moderately improve his statistical chances of being able
to make bail. See, e.g., PhiladelphiaBail Study 1032-43; New York Bail Study 707
(giving figures for the proportion of New York defendants able to make bail at
varying amounts, for example, 25% at $5,000 and 55% at $1,500).
Moreover, a defendant who obtains his freedom by having his bail reduced on
appeal is still subject to possible harassment. For a flagrant example, compare the
two opinions in Gusick v. Boies, 72 Ariz. 233, 233 P.2d 446 (1951), and 72 Ariz. 309,
234 P.2d 430 (1951) (after getting appellate relief, defendant was rearrested twice
as prosecutor added new counts to indictment on which additional bail was demanded).
190 This conclusion assumes that a state order denying bail is a final state judgment for the purpose of review by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958).
See, e.g., Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963), which suggests
that a state bail denial would be final, but that it has not been explicitly so held.
For an analysis of Mercantile Nat'l Bank and other recent cases see AmSTERDAm,

THE DEFENSIVE TRANSFER OF CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION FROM STATE TO FEDERAL

COURTS 339-42 & n.189 (1965). Compare Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (federal
district court denial of bail "final" for purpose of review under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1958)).
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An alternative tactic, and one that would have to be resorted to
if processes of judicial review could not be exhausted before trial was
had, would be to raise the bail issue on appeal from conviction. This
tactic would probably succeed, for where federal constitutional issues
are at stake the defendant would probably not be barred by a holding
that the only remedy for excessive bail was by pretrial motion and that
the issue might not be grounds for reversal on appeal after conviction. 1 The most obvious defect of the tactic is that the delay in
obtaining an adjudication of the detention issue would deny the
hypothetical defendant any relief at all should he in fact not be convicted at his trial. While the cynical might argue that for practical
purposes nonconviction and avoidance of a possibly long prison sentence is remedy enough, it is precisely the case where the defendant
is ultimately not convicted in which pretrial punishment by detention
is most offensive to our concept of justice. Such cases are not rarefor example, twenty-seven per cent of a recent sample of jailed New
York City felony defendants were not convicted 1' 2-- and point up the
urgent need of procedures which will resolve detention issues before
trial and before irreparable harm has been done.
In the hypothetical defendant's case, moreover, tactical considerations suggest that the only effective relief is a speedy, pretrial remedy.
If he is detained, not permitted to search for his alibi witnesses and
then convicted, how is he to show after his trial that he has been
prejudiced by the detention? If in fact he is innocent of the robbery,
he will continue because of his imprisonment to be unable to prove it.
Even if he were released at some later date to search for Joe, Jo Ann
and Charlie, passage of time is likely to have speedily erased all trace
of them. The best and probably only way to find out whether or not
the defendant is being prejudiced by detention in preparing a defense is
to release him immediately and see, for example, if he can produce
those witnesses whom he claims he alone can locate.
Recent developments in civil rights litigation may have laid the
groundwork for a method whereby a prompt pretrial adjudication of
19 1 E.g., State v. Petrucelli, 37 N.J. Super. 1, 116 A.2d 721 (Super. Ct. 1955). But
see State v. Teeter, 65 Nev. 584, 609, 200 P.2d 657, 670 (1948) (possible alternative
holding: improper denial of discretionary bail "substantially affect[s] the validity of
the judgment" in murder case).
Compare Timmons v. United States, 343 F2d 310, 311 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per
curiam) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) : "Because the issue [of pretrial detention as an
interference with preparation for trial and consultation with counsel] has been raised
for the first time on appeal, it is not possible to assess the prejudice which appellant
suffered."
may have
9
1 2 Rankin, The Effect of PretrialDetention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 641, 642 Table 1
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Rankin]. Compare New York Bail Study 727 (20% of
much smaller sample not guilty); Philadelphia Bail Study 1052 (18% of sample of
340 jail cases not convicted).
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the constitutional bail issues can be obtained in a federal court.

In

both In re Shuttlesworth I and Dresner v. Stoutamire I" civil rights

defendants faced the prospect of having to serve jail sentences while
pursuing state remedies after conviction since the state denied bail
pending appeal. The defendants then applied for federal habeas
corpus. In Shuttlesworth the Supreme Court ordered the federal
district court
. . . to hold the matter while petitioner pursues his state
remedies . . . including an application for bail to state courts

pending disposition of petitioner's application for state relief.
In the event of failure to secure such relief, or to secure admission to bail pending such relief within five (5) days from
the date of application for bail, . . . [the district court]

may then consider all state remedies exhausted and proceed
to hear and determine the cause, including any application for
bail pending that court's final disposition of the matter.'95
In Dresner the state court was given only three days to afford release
on "nominal bail." '0
The bail situation is sufficiently analogous for the same procedure
to be available. The civil rights defendants in the absence of extraordinary federal relief would have had to serve their sentences, thereby
suffering the punishment alleged to be unconstitutional and mooting
any adjudication of constitutional claims. In the bail situation a substantial proportion of defendants jailed pending trial are sentenced
upon conviction to time already served or are given credit for that
time against a longer sentence. 7 Realistically, therefore, for most
defendants time in detention constitutes anticipatory service of all or
part of a punishment formally imposed at a later date. Insofar as
Shuttlesworth and Dresner rest on the prevention of imposition of
punishment pending adjudication of constitutional objections, therefore, the analogy of the bail cases is very close. To the extent that the
reasoning of those civil rights cases is to prevent mootness, the bail
situation presents a somewhat different case. If Shuttlesworth had
finished service of his sentence before his appeal had been adjudicated,
his case would have been irrevocably moot; but if a defendant is
forced to trial without pretrial liberty, is then convicted and sentenced
INs
94

1
195

369 U.S. 35 (1962) (per curiam).

No. 21802, 5th Cir., Aug. 5, 1964.

369 U.S. 35 (1962) (per curiam).
19 6 For an illuminating discussion of this strategy see A=sTEnDAm, op. cit. supra
note 190, at 281-84.
197 See discussion id. at 324-25. In a sample of 958 jail cases examined in the
PhiladelphiaBail Sthdy 1049 n.72 , 472 defendants were sentenced to further imprisonment with credit for time served before trial and 90 were released after being convicted
and sentenced to time served awaiting trial.
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to further imprisonment, his constitutional bail claims could still be
raised on appeal. This distinction, however, should not be dispositive
for three reasons. First, if the bail defendant is convicted, and should
win his bail question on appeal, we have noted that relief may come
too late to be helpful if he can no longer locate his missing witnesses.
In that event the court would have to face the unpleasant choice of
allowing a retrial after unconstitutional deprivation of pretrial liberty
has already done irreparable damage or of freeing the defendant outright. Second, it is much more difficult to estimate the degree of
prejudice suffered by the defendant if the issue is to be determined
only on appeal after conviction. Third, if the defendant is not convicted, his constitutional claims will have been mooted in precisely the
same manner as in Shuttlesworth and he will have served allegedly unconstitutional anticipatory punishment which has proven to be unjustified without any opportunity for adjudication of his claims. These
considerations suggest why the federal courts should and probably
would follow the Shuttlesworth precedent in bail cases.
This important development in federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
should for the first time open an effective procedure for testing
constitutional issues in bail cases. Counsel could file simultaneous
petitions in the appropriate state and federal courts, alleging that if the
petitioner is not released forthwith on his own recognizance he will
continue to be deprived of specified constitutional rights. The federal
petition, citing Shuttlesworth and Dresner, would ask the court to take
jurisdiction unless immediate relief was forthcoming in the state
proceeding. If counsel is adequately prepared," legal developments
in civil rights cases have shown that very speedy adjudication in the
federal system is possible even if it is necessary to go to the court of
appeals or the Supreme Court.
C. Constitutional Issues for Decision
Under existing bail law the hypothetical defendant has little chance
of prevailing in his effort to achieve immediate release without financial
security. As we have seen, by the federal rule of Stack v. Boyle,"9
which is generally applied in the states as well, bail in an amount usually
fixed for the crime charged is not deemed excessive; individualized
standards for bail setting, for example, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46, apparently do not apply, and in practice are not applied,
where bail has been set in such an average amount."° The hypothetical
118 See the discussion in AmSTERDAm, op. ci. supra note 190, at 324-25.

342 U.S. 1 (1951) ; 5see Crisis in Bail: I, at 994-96.
id. at 995 nn.16 -66.
"In Los Angeles in the Superior Court we have a bail schedule. Let us take just
one example, assault with a deadly weapon. Slight injuries, $500; slight injuries
'99

200 See
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defendant is held in 2,500 dollars bail on a charge of armed robbery,
and counsel's investigation would speedily disclose that this amount is
not beyond the average range for so serious a charge.
Reliance will have to be placed, therefore, on hints in very recent
cases '" that Stack v. Boyle may not be the last word as far as indigents are concerned; on theories of due process which, although frequently applied, have never been invoked in the bail field; and on an
attempt to tie together eighth amendment and equal protection theories
which explicitly invite the courts to create new law notwithstanding
strong historical tradition to the contrary. While there is inevitable
overlapping among the claims relevant to the hypothetical defendant's
case, it is helpful for purposes of analysis to state each separately.
1. He is being denied the fundamental fairness guaranteed by
the due process of law because, although he alleges he is innocent, he is
being punished by imprisonment before he has been tried.
2. He is being denied procedural due process because detention
adversely affects the disposition of his case and thereby deprives him
of a fair trial.
3. He is denied equal protection of the law because, solely on
account of his poverty, he is being denied pretrial liberty.
4. His right to bail under the eighth and fourteenth amendments
is being violated because the proscription against "excessive" bail must
be construed in such a way as not automatically to foreclose for indigents the fundamental right to freedom pending trial.
Two threads run through all of these allegations. First are the
underlying values of a democratic administration of justice which make
up due process of law. Kadish has described them in this way:
The various procedural safeguards traditionally demanded in the name of due process appear to be directed to
two objectives. One is the goal of insuring the reliability of
the guilt-determining process-reducing to a minimum the
possibility that any innocent individual will be punished. It
is not of crucial importance whether the individual tried is in
fact guilty or innocent, but it is of crucial concern that the integrity of the process of ascertaining guilt or innocence never
be impaired ....
The second objective . .

.

traditionally deemed a part

of the due process of law is more elusive and subtle. But its
with prior felony, $1,000; serious injuries, $2,000; serious injuries with prior felony,

$3,000."

PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 198

(1965) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL BAIL CONFERENCE] (statement of Judge
Joseph A. Wapner, presiding judge, Superior Court, Los Angeles).
201 See notes 268, 284-85 infra.
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vitality is manifest in a number of requirements not fully
explicable in terms of the first objective. . . . Central to
these requirements is the notion of man's dignity, which is
denigrated equally by procedures that fail to respect his
intrinsic privacy or that . . . exhibit a disdain for the value
202
of the human personality ....
When applied to an analysis of the bail system, these central due
process values are infused with the ideals which cluster around the
concept of equal justice. Pretrial detention may be regarded, in all or
at least in some instances, as an infringement of the minimum essentials of a fair trial because it prejudices the disposition of the detainee's
case. It may be categorized as an unjustifiable invasion of individual
privacy and dignity because it imposes the punishment of imprisonment
before final determination of guilt. As the application of these values
of fairness and privacy necessarily involves drawing along a continuum
an inevitably arbitrary line dividing the constitutionally permissible
from the impermissible, the purpose of the detention becomes an important factor to be considered in determining the precise locus of
division. If the only reason for detention is that the defendant is
poor, as would be true in the case of an indisputably good bail risk, a
very slight showing of prejudice or invasion of privacy should be
sufficient to tip the constitutional scales.
The second thread connecting the hypothetical defendant's various
allegations relates to the purpose of his detention. His claim that he
is being discriminated against solely on account of his poverty may be
his strongest appeal to our sympathy, but it is also the weakest link in
his argument. The state's reply is a simple one: the 2,500 dollars bond
is not intended to discriminate against the poor but to give the state
some security that all defendants will appear for trial. We will have
to return to the problem this reply presents below; it is sufficient here
to note that the question of intention is seldom an easy one. It is
rare that a stated objective is so patently false that the mask can im20 3
It is
mediately be torn away to reveal an underlying illicit purpose.
rare, too, that one can meet the burden of proof required to show that
a statutory policy fair on its face is actually discriminatory in its
application. 04 Clearly the state has a strong and legitimate interest
in compelling appearance at trial or after final disposition of an appeal.
202 Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudicatioi-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 346-47 (1957).
203 E.g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 237 (1915) (Oklahoma "grandfather
clause' invalidated under fifteenth amendment even though by its terms it made no
discrimination on racial grounds).
204 One case in which a statute fair on its face was held arbitrarily applied is
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 365 (1886) (ordinance regulating laundries in wooden
buildings systematically administered so as to discriminate against Chinese but not
Caucasian laundries).
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It is far from clear, however, that bail in its predominate modern
form--commercial bonding-bears any significant relationship to this
legitimate state interest. As Judge J. Skelly Wright of the District
of Columbia recently put it,
*

.

.

bail has become a barnacle on the back of the criminal

law. Theoretically a defendant out on bond is in the custody
of his bondsman. Thus the bondsman is allowed to charge
a modest fee, ten per cent of the bond, for the service he
renders and the risk he runs. Actually a defendant on bond
is in the custody of no one and the police and the FBI are
much more familiar with his whereabouts than his bondsman.
Moreover, if the defendant fails to appear for trial, it is the
FBI or the police who pick him up--yet the bondsman gets
the fee. In short, the bondsman gets paid for rendering no
real service .

...

5

Or, to look at the other side of the coin, the indigent defendant is
jailed for inability to put up the fee for the purchase of something
which renders no service to the state.
D. Problems of Due Process
1. Prejudice From Pretrial Detention
The hypothetical defendant's due process claims involve two quite
different kinds of prejudice. The first is unrelated to fair trial or the
method of adjudicating guilt or innocence. It turns instead on the
second limb of Kadish's analysis: the "notion of man's dignity" and
"the value of the human personality." 200 That punishment by imprisonment prior to conviction is an evil to be tolerated, if at all, only
because of compelling social necessity needs no elaboration. We have
noted that probably at least one-quarter of the total pretrial jail population is never convicted °7 As there is no question that such a statistic
represents a prejudicial invasion of human values, the only problem
is how much to weigh it against the supposed necessity that has produced it. Nor is the prejudice limited to those who are never convicted. Among the entire population subjected to pretrial detentionand their relatives and friends-the felt injustice of punishment without
a finding of guilt cannot but impair that confidence in the law's fairness
which must be the touchstone of a jurisprudence dedicated to respect
for human dignity. The only plausible explanation for the gross
205 Wright, Criminta Law and the Bill of Rights, The Reporter, June 3, 1965,
p. 23. See also Judge Wright's concurring opinion in Pannell v. United States, 320
F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
206 Kadish, supra note 202, at 347.
207 E.g., Rankin 642 (27% of sample of 358 jailed defendants were not convicted);
Philadelphia Bail Study 1052, Table 1 (depending on offense, proportion of jailed
defendants not convicted ranged from 7% to 277a) ; New York Bail Study 726-27.
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undervaluation of this shocking result of the bail system in the due
process market place of competing values is that the population which
is prejudiced is stigmatized by accusation of crime and rendered powerless and voiceless by poverty.
The second type of prejudice which contemporary bail law imposes on the poor is the adverse effect on the guilt-determining and
punishment-setting process through which the unbailed indigent defendant must pass. It is helpful to distinguish three kinds of infection
which can sap the vitality of the trial: (a) special circumstances
which, when they exist, may prejudice the particular defendant concerned; (b) pretrial detention conditions which themselves pollute the
impartiality of the trial process but which could be corrected through
general reforms; (c) inevitable concomitants of detention which corrupt the fairness of the trial afforded detained as compared with bailed
defendants. All three of these kinds of trial prejudice are involved
in the hypothetical defendant's case.
In some respects this three-part classification parallels the sources
of prejudice examined in the right to counsel controversy. The first
suggests the rule of Betts v. Brady; o the second, the ways in which,
without affording counsel, it was maintained that a trial could be
nonetheless made fair as, for example, through the protective role of
the trial judge; 209 and the last, the presumption of prejudice from
want of counsel which finally produced Gideon v. Wainwright. 10 Indeed, the problems of bail and of counsel for indigents present some
striking similarities. In the initial stages of each development, logic,
analysis and policy were all subordinated to the amorphous but pervasive force of a conditioned historical reflex. Once a breach was
made in the wall of historical tradition in the counsel cases, the
ultimate ascendency of fairness over history was assured; in retrospect one only wonders why it took us so long to act upon the obvious
proposition that fairness in criminal defense requires the assistance of
counsel. It will be interesting to see whether the development of bail
law will again subject us to a gloomy interregnum of the kind that
prevailed between Betts and Gideon.
a. Factors of "Special" Prejudice
The hypothetical defendant is set apart from the mainstream of
the detained in at least three respects. Where the majority of criminal
208

316 U.S. 455 (1942).

[T]he fair conduct
[".T..
209 See, e.g., Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 781 (1949)
of a trial depends largely on the wisdom and understanding of the trial judge. He
knows the essentials of a fair trial. . . . He may guide a defendant without a lawyer
past the errors that make trials unfair."
210 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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cases pose only an issue of treatment of a concededly guilty defendant,
there is at least some doubt about the hypothetical defendant's guilt,
and in close cases any possible prejudice resulting from detention
status therefore takes on added significance. Moreover, unlike most
of that minority of cases in which there is a disputed issue of fact, here
possible verification of the defendant's version of the facts poses particular investigative problems for whose resolution the accused himself
is uniquely qualified. Finally, this defendant, because of the lineup
and post-hearing interrogation, was subjected to interference with his
qualified right to be left alone which went beyond anything required to
keep him in secure custody pending trial.
Any one of these deviations from the mean of normal pretrial
indigent detention may provide the necessary ingredient for a meritorious claim based on the first limb of Kadish's due process model;
and in each instance the claim can be seasoned by the fact that except
for the defendant's indigency he would have been exempted from having
to take on that added risk.
The defendant's alibi sounds improbable but it cannot be entirely
discounted. The fact that those parts of his statement which the
investigator could check out were truthful gives some support to his
credibility. Perhaps most significant, we know that while he tried to
borrow ten dollars from his sister on Saturday morning, by that
evening-before the time of the robbery-he had acquired enough
assets to make her a gift of thirty dollars. In contrast, two of the
strongest links in the prosecution's evidence-the similarity of his car
to the one described at the scene of the robbery and the identification
of the defendant by the white customer, Williams-need to be viewed
with some scepticism. The first is damaging but far from conclusive
in these days of northward Negro migration, when the presence in
Negro sections of northeastern cities of "old, dark" cars with Virginia
plates is not uncommon. As for the identification, one needs to recall
the experience drawn from studies of cases in which persons were
convicted of crimes of which they were later proved innocent:
Perhaps erroneous identification of the accused constitutes the major cause of the known wrongful convictions.
In many such a case the witness lied, sometimes at the
prompting or with the knowledge of the police or the prosecutor. More often, however, the witness made an honest
error2 1
2 11

In most of the cases discussed
FRANK & FRANK, NOT GUILTY 61 (1957).
there were identification mistakes. See also BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT
(1932); HALE, HANGED IN ERROR 45, 76, 115-16 (1961); PAGET & SILVER A ,
HANGED-AND INNOCENT? (1953).
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If lineup identification evidence is unreliable at best, moreover, it is
least reliable when it requires a white witness to distinguish one Negro
from another."'
Because the tendency of any system of criminal justice is to bury
its own mistakes, we have no way of estimating the incidence of
erroneous identifications which result in unjust convictions. There
is cause for uneasiness, however, when one considers those cases in
which a mistake has been established. They are characterized not
only by the resistance of officialdom to any admission of error but
also by the fortuitous character of the events which led to exoneration.213 The actual criminal may have been later arrested for another
crime under circumstances which happened to instigate a reopening
of the earlier case, the conscience of some public official or the curiosity
of a newspaper reporter may keep a case alive despite the finality of
conviction, or in very rare instances the unjustly convicted person himself may after release devote his remaining years and resources to the
search for vindiction. 2 1 The fact that it takes such a combination of
luck, concern and resources to correct a mistake long after the fact
suggests that the ratio of undiscovered to discovered error may be far
higher than we would like to imagine.
One of the most damaging facts implicating the hypothetical defendant is also the most elusive: the apparent general worthlessness of
the defendant as a person. To establish his alibi he will have to take
the stand himself and through cross-examination to test his credibility
his life will become an open book. It would not be surprising if a
jury reacted to him as did a former British Home Secretary in commenting upon the case of an innocent person hanged for murder:
If Galley was wrongfully convicted, he certainly assisted
very much in his own conviction by the irregular and improper life he led. .

. .

negligence on his part2 15

It is something like contributory

But since we are concerned only with whether this man perpetrated this particular robbery, the search for truth is elusive and in
constant danger of contamination from damaging but irrelevant factors.
Under these circumstances pretrial detention itself may be a significant
source of such contamination. The hypothetical defendant must appear
212 Empirical studies done under the auspices of the Institute of Legal Research,
University of Pennsylvania Law School, as yet unpublished, indicate that white
subjects perform significantly more poorly in the identification of Negroes than they
do in the identification of whites.
213E.g., FRANK & FRANK, NoT Guirr 74-78 (1957).
24 See, e.g., id. at 74-78 (the case of Clifford T. Shepard).
215 Robert Lowe, as quoted by HALE, HANGED IN ERROR 119 (1961).
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before the jury in custody and thereby be typed as one not to be
trusted; his testimony reveals him as a parasite, yet but for his detention he would be holding down his job at the car wash.
A second but related form of prejudice posed in the hypothetical
case which might provide the foundation for a due process claim arises
from the nature of the evidence needed to corroborate defendant's
alibi. If the alibi witnesses are to be located, it would appear that the
defendant needs the opportunity for self-help. Any indigent defendant
will lack the resources to finance a pretrial investigation by others and
it is a melancholy fact of the administration of our legal aid offices
that investigatory services are normally not provided. While the
problem is being attacked in the federal system, at the time of the
Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the
Administration of Federal Criminal Justice in 1963 a "fundamental
deficiency" was the "failure of the practices prevailing in all the district courts outside the District of Columbia to provide assigned
counsel with resources" for investigation.21
It is not possible to determine the percentage of cases in
which these deficiencies reach serious proportions. It is clear,
however, that the impact on the individual defendant is
devastating when it does occur ...

21

Another report states that in not more than eighteen out of 184 defender organizations are full time investigators on the payroll; indeed,
in many there was not even a full time lawyer.218
Even where, as stipulated in the hypothetical case, the defense
afforded indigents includes some facilities for pretrial investigation, an
indigent defendant may suffer substantial prejudice if he is incarcerated. In part this would depend upon the time, resourcefulness
and interest of the investigator, who is probably attached to a public
or voluntary defender office which may have a tendency to become
mechanical when harassed by large case loads. More important, it
will also turn on the type of evidence which is needed. The Attorney
General's Committee was informed "by experienced defense counsel
that in some cases it is only the accused who can locate and induce
reluctant witnesses to come forward." 219 Where racial or class differences isolate a subculture, the type of situation reported from New
Haven may apply:
210 AI fy GEN. COMM. ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINrAL JUSTICE, REPORT

26 (1963)

[hereinafter cited as ATrT'Y GEN. REP.].

217 Ibid.
2 18

TTEBACH,

THE RATIONING
209 (1964).
REP. 71.

CRImNAL PRoCESS
219 ATT'Y GEN'.

OF JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE
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Student directors of the Yale Law School Public Defender Association report that Negroes are most reluctant to
talk to white people regarding any criminal matter. They
have found it impossible to locate Negro witnesses that the
accused could probably find within a short period of time if
permitted to search for them." °
Social workers and others doing investigative work in Negro slum
areas would probably substantiate the existence of this problem, which
would be particularly acute in this case where one of those sought
(Charlie) would be a prime suspect himself were defendant's story
true.
The traditional approach of the courts, by which this problem is
reached only at trial or on appeal after conviction, has severe limitations. In one case the trial court recessed for half a day to permit the
previously jailed defendant, accompanied by two detectives, to search
for a missing witness whom his legal aid counsel had been unable to
locate."' How adequate this device might prove to be in our hypothetical case is a matter for speculation. One would suppose that a
search limited in time by a defendant with two (white?) detectives at
his elbow might be substantially less fruitful than to permit him to
circulate at his leisure in the neighborhood and at its bars. Another
court summarily rejected a similar claim of prejudice due to the jailed
In an opinion
defendant's inability to search for an alibi witness.2 2
of
an appellate
that perhaps represents the ultimate in the isolation
court from reality it was held sufficient for the defendant to be advised
"of the subpoena power available to him and that the Federal Bureau
of Investigation could be asked to locate the witness." 3 It seems
clear that in the hypothetical case there is no practicable substitute to
pretrial release for investigative purposes.
A third kind of "special prejudice" is posed by the hypothetical
case. The defendant was involuntarily exhibited in a lineup, which
resulted in substantial new prosecution evidence against him, and the
Note, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 969-70 & n.27 (1961).
United States ex rel. Hyde v. McMann, 263 F.2d 940, 942-43 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 937 (1959) :
Hyde asserts that during the afternoon and evening he succeeded, where his
counsel had failed, in locating the house where he claimed to have spent the
night of February 7-8 and that he learned that a girl answering the description of Jo Ann had resided at the house but that she had left about seventeen
days after the date of his arrest when the bar in which she worked was
raided by the police.
The trial court refused a further continuance and on application for federal habeas
corpus the Second Circuit found no denial of due process, the state being required
to do no more than afford an opportunity for search by counsel. 263 F.2d at 943. The
court was apparently convinced of Hyde's guilt ("It is small wonder that a jury
convicted Hyde. . . ." Id. at 942.) and never discussed the bail issues which were
pressed in the Brief for Petitioner pp. 2, 8-29.
v. United States, 335 F.2d 1021 (10th Cir. 1964).
222Fitts
22 Id. at 1023.
20
221
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police attempted to exploit the psychological effect of Williams' identification of the defendant by an interrogation which they hoped would
produce a confession. The prosecution was able to obtain this dual
advantage solely because of the defendant's pretrial detention status;
if he had been enlarged on bail, police jurisdiction over him could not
have been obtained without his consent. 24
Whether or not involuntary subjection to the lineup of a detained
indigent for the purpose of investigating other crimes of which he is
suspected violates the Constitution has recently been the subject of
conflicting decisions in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 5 In
Butler v. Crumlish " Judge Freedman entered a preliminary injunction to restrain the police, finding "substantial merit" in the claimed
violation of the equal protection clause. Although he deplored the
"deep and wounding social inequality" of the bail system, 227 he stated

that "differences that necessarily result from imprisonment while awaiting trial and freedom on bail cannot be made the foundation for any
constitutional objection because of discrimination." Is But this "furnishes no justification for any additional inequality of treatment beyond
that which is inherent in the confinement itself." 11 While this case
became moot before it came on for full hearing on the merits, two
others were subsequently brought before a different judge and decided
contra,'" and one of these is now on appeal.231
b. Prejudice Created by Unnecessary Conditions of Detention
Like' a small hole in a weakening dike, Judge Freedman's approach in Butler v. Crumlish though presently permitting but a trickle
22 Compare Lee v. United States, 322 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1963), where after
indictment and fifteen days of detention two special agents went to the indigent
prisoner's cell and questioned him. The court held that the admissions obtained
by the agents were inadmissible and reversed, motivated in part by the unreliability
of the testimony about the interrogation which the agents had never reduced to writing. The thrust of the majority's argument was that the evidence was the product
of an "invidious discrimination against indigent defendants." Id. at 777. Strangely,
however, the court never mentioned bail. As the crime was not capital and therefore
bailable, Lee must have been detained because of inability to post bail and he was
repeatedly referred to as indigent. Instead, the court found a violation of the right
to counsel because Lee had not yet been assigned a lawyer, the Government conceding
that "secret, ex parte interrogations of defendants are not conducted when a prisoner
has counsel," and "legal ethics forbid . . . bypass[ing] the lawyer of a defendant
fortunate
enough to have the means to engage counsel.' Ibid.
22 5
Compare Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Pa. 1964), with Morris
v. Crumlish, 239 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Pa. 1965), and Rigney v. Hendrick, E.D. Pa.
No. 37791, April 7, 1965.
226 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
27 Id. at 568. The inequality is "increasingly oppressive to the poor and the
vagrant. It brings to mind Anatole France's ironic epigram that the law in its
majestic impartiality forbids the rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges." Ibid.
228 Id. at 566.
229 Id. at 567.
2 30
Rigney v. Hendrick, E.D. Pa., No. 37791, April 7, 1965; Morris v. Crumlish,
239 F.
2 3 Supp. 498 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
1 Rigney v. Hendrick, supra note 230.
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of doubt, may in time become the source of a torrent of change. If
his standard-that what makes the lineup bad is that it goes beyond
"those restraints which are an essential part of the management of a
prison" s is accepted, it will be but a short step to apply that same
measuring rod to other aspects of pretrial detention. It is common
knowledge that the county jail typically used for pretrial detention is,
in the words of a leading penologist, "the lowest form of social institution on the American scene." 233 That the existing conditions of
pretrial imprisonment-poor food and housing, overcrowding, inadequate or no recreation and exercise facilities-are neither "essential"
to sound prison management nor "inherent in the confinement itself" M is ironically demonstrated by the fact that at the point when
an accused is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, his standard of
living is almost certain to rise. 3 5
Nor can the necessity for reasonable security against escape
justify the kinds of restrictions on communication with the outside
world which are common in detention jails: limitations upon and
censorship of mail,"3 restrictions on newspapers and periodicals, a
frequently total prohibition on the use of the telephone, inadequate
237
facilities for confidential conversations with lawyers and others,
232 Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565, 566 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
233 McGee, The Administration of Justice: The CorrectionalProcess, 5 NATIoNAL
PROBATION & PAROLE A.J. 225, 228 (1959).
234 Butler
23

v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565, 567 (E.D. Pa. 1964).

5 New York Bail Study 723-25. The "pattern of custody" in New York de-

tention prisons "is more restrictive than that ordinarily imposed on convicted prisoners
in sentence institutions.

.

. . Overcrowding is particularly in evidence ....

[D]etention is a period of oppressive inactivity." Id. at 724-25. See also FtEED &
WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITE1 STATES: 1964, at 43-45 (Report to the National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice, 1964) [hereinafter cited as FREED & WALD].
In Trebach's sample of 359 convicted prisoners living in penitentiaries, those
expressing a judgment as to the relative conditions between their pretrial jail and
their sentence serving institution preferred the penitentiary by a ratio of 12 to 1.
TFEAcH, op. cit. supra note 218, at 83, 264.
. . . [M]ost men came forth with critical comments . . . One . . . inmate

, told me, "I'd rather do six months here than the two months I did
down there [a New Jersey county jail]. They starve you to death, don't
give you no exercise. They should do something about that place."
Id. at 82.
2361 have in mind censorship of ideas and content, as distinguished from inspection of incoming mail to prevent importation of, for example, narcotics or files. As
for limits on mail, see, e.g., PhiladelphiaBail Study 1055 (untried prisoner may write
two letters a week).
23= Cf. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962), where the state conceded it
had used electronic devices to eavesdrop on the conversation of a prison inmate with
his visitor.
It has been reported that a New York trial judge found it necessary to
release a prisoner without bail so that he would be able to consult his attorney, the judge not being able to feel confident after [the Lanza] incident
that there was any jail in the State where the prisoner and his lawyers could
be secure against electronic eavesdropping.
Id. at 149 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
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visiting privileges only for close relatives, 2 restriction of visits to
times which are particularly inconvenient to members of the working
class, conducting visits under restrictions which impede or censor
communication and humiliate visitor and visited alike. These limitations are as unnecessary to the legitimate purpose of detentionsecurity-as is the lineup, and, in their contempt for man's dignity and
their probable tendency to coerce guilty pleas, far more pernicious as a
contamination of the values for which due process stands. Whether
or not such restrictions are deliberately intended to punish and
humiliate, they certainly have that effect, and some judges use pretrial
detention explicitly for punitive purposes, for example, to give the
accused "a taste of jail."

29

From at least the time of Blackstone, who saw the period between
confinement and trial as a "dubious interval" during which "a prisoner
ought to be treated with the utmost humanity," 240 it has proved as
impossible politically and administratively to bring detention conditions
up to minimum standards as was the effort to use legislative, administrative, or political means to put effective curbs on unlawful
2
4
police search prior to Weeks v. United States' and Mapp v. Ohio. 4

Blackstone put the blame on the goalers, who "are frequently a merciless race of men, and, by being conversant in scenes of misery, steeled
against any tender sensation." 243 Today we would suspect that, while
administrative insensitivity to human values remains an important
factor, much deeper forces are at work. Existing conditions of pretrial detention are an example of the limited efficacy of an ideal such
as the presumption of innocence, particularly where such detention
advantages the prosecution and the reduces the judge's burdens by
contributing to a high rate of guilty pleas. Packer, in his exposition
of a "crime control model" in criminal administration, states the
prosecution position as follows: "If the present system of requiring
bail for some reason or other stopped producing a high rate of pretrial
23

For an extreme application, see Akamine v. Murphy, 108 Cal. App. 2d 294,

238 P.2d 606 (1951), upholding refusal of jail to permit husband held pending trial
to be visited by his wife, recently released from same jail, because of jail rule prohibiting released inmate from visiting any other inmate within thirty days of release.
239 E.g., New York Bail Study 705. Compare the remarks of magistrates setting
high bail in Philadelphia as indicative of their motives, for example: "He is a Puerto
Rican. What a bum." "Anyone who hits his father ought to be electrocuted." "I'm
going to make an example of you." Philadelphia Bail Study 1039. Chief Judge Roy
W. Harper of the United States District Court, St. Louis told the National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice that "one of the best deterrents is detention
for about 24 to 48 hours to see the inside of a jail house." NATIoAL BAIL CoNFERENCE 192.
2404 BLAcKsToNE; CommmTAIEs 297 (1st Am. ed. 1772).
241232 U.S. 383 (1914).
242 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2434 BLAcKsTorE_ COmmENTARIES 297 (1st Am. ed. 1772).
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confinement, it would have to be replaced by one that did." 24 If this
represents the practicalities of the situation as seen by the prosecution
and probably by many trial judges as well, then it is idle to expect
the administrative machinery to press for any real reform of pretrial
detention.
The only proposed solution likely to have any success in raising
the level of detention conditions is one patterned on the exclusionary
rule: to condition the right to detain, which benefits the prosecution,
upon minimization of prejudice and the maintenance of standards commensurate with the untried status of the detention population. The
remedy for failure to meet this test would be immediate release on
recognizance pending trial. Whatever may be the merits of the
judicial doctrine that the courts will not interfere with the management of institutions for sentenced prisoners, 45 it should be inapplicable
insofar as pretrial detention is concerned. The courts have a direct
responsibility to supervise what happens between arrrest and trial in
order to preserve the integrity of the trial process.
c. Inevitable Prejudice in Any Form of Detention
Some of the inevitable concomitants of detention are obvious and
need to be reiterated only because they are so significant. Most
important, the detained prisoner cannot hold a job, which is probably
the principal explanation of the empirical data to be discussed below
which demonstrates that jail defendants fare far worse in the sentencing process, particularly in obtaining probation, than bail defendants. Second, if the defendant cannot earn a lawyer's fee he has
no choice of lawyer and must take the counsel provided by the state.
Third, the detained defendant's relationship with his family is curtailed
and the possibility of his supporting them is terminated.
What is in danger of being overlooked, however, are more
subtle facets of the problem. The following hypotheses have not been
proved empirically; some of them probably are not susceptible to such
proof. They are, however, plausible and should not be ignored in an
attempt to calculate the extent of the detention system's contamination
of the trial process.2 4
Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 41 (1964).
See, e.g., Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 392 P.2d 279 (1964) (for prisoner
to obtain relief in courts from prison regulations, he must show such shocking treatment as to amount to cruel and unusual punishment). See generally Note, 110 U. PA.
L. REv. 985 (1962).
246 Research by Dr. Jerome H. Skolnick, of the Center for the Study of Law
and Society, University of California, Berkeley, who is preparing a book tentatively
244

245

entitled Justice Without Trial, will prove relevant to further study of these hypotheses.
Sociological inquiry of the kind being done by Skolnick should give added insight
regarding the problems posed in all of these hypothetical propositions.
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(1) The expectations of all those connected with the administration of criminal justice-police, jailers, prosecutors, defense counsel,
judges, probation officers-prejudge the jail case as a failure, and this
prejudgment colors their actual disposition; for example, a probation
officer assigned to write up a jail case has a bias before he begins
because of the defendant's jail status. If this is true, then the statistics showing that jailed defendants do in fact fare comparatively
badly in the disposition process may in part demonstrate nothing more
than the operation of a self-fulfilling prophecy.
(2) The fact that the defendant himself shares this expectation
of failure tends, along with the fact that he will generally have to find
a new job, to reduce the chances of his successfully completing a
period of probation.
(3) The quality of representation which a jail defendant obtains
is adversely affected by pretrial detention because, instead of the
defendant coming to his office, counsel must go to the jail to see the
defendant, often under conditions unfavorable to privacy and mutual
dignity. The added economic burden this places on the lawyer may
be considerable in large cities where, as in Philadelphia, the detention
prison is geographically remote from lawyers' offices. The result is a
reduction in the frequency of pretrial consultation below that which is
desirable and which would take place were the defendant on bail and
able to come to the lawyer's office. The burden on the lawyer may
also intensify his resentment if he is already concerned about the low
work-to-fee ratio of much criminal representation.
(4) The quality of the lawyer-client relationship is adversely
affected by pretrial detention because the jailed defendant will have
less confidence in counsel and is more likely than a bailed defendant to
feel that he is getting inadequate representation. Jail house consultation with the lawyer intensifies the defendant's disassociation with
counsel because he has had no responsibility in the selection of the
lawyer; confirms his opinion that because he has no money he is
receiving second class legal services; 2" induces that resentment which
247For the purpose of the defendant's attitude and its effect on his relationship
with his lawyer, the fact that the state appointed lawyer may be as able as a retained

counsel is not significant if defendants' opinion is to the contrary. The author on
several occasions has observed a lawyer come into a detention jail where newly
admitted prisoners are brought to him one by one. The lawyer's opening question
was, in effect: how much money do you have or can you raise? The interview was
terminated immediately if the answer was unsatisfactory. These rejected prisoners
were later represented by the public defender and probably received better legal services
than would have been provided by the private lawyers, who had reputations as fixers
and as being legally incompetent. But the psychological undertones of such transactions
are obvious and must impair the defendant's opinion of the fairness of the trial process.
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the poor feel because they are treated as charity cases; and adds to
his suspicion that the adversary system may in fact not be very
adversary when counsel is a public defender who is paid by the state
and whose professional career is the representation of jail house
failures.
(5) The defendant's prospects for rehabilitation turn in part upon
his outlook towards the fairness of the administration of justice, which
is adversely affected by his detention experience. A defendant's attitudes are crystallized in prison, where the most obvious lesson of
the pretrial period is that if you have money you go out, i.e., that
justice is for sale. Those familiar with detention prisons are aware
that this cynical attitude dominates the value culture of the jail.
2. Empirical Evidence on Results of Detention
We have already noted some of the empirical data which documents the unfavorable effects of pretrial detention upon the ultimate
disposition of jailed defendants' cases."' But the fact that there are
correlations between pretrial jail status and less favorable dispositions
does not of itself prove that there is a causal relationship. The problem of causation is nicely illustrated by some data reported by Professor
Anders Bratholm at the University of Oslo. In discussing the kind
of cases in which pretrial detention is ordered in Norway he says:
The incidence of detention is highest for those persons
who are later convicted and sentenced to an unconditional
term of imprisonment. In round figures, about seventy
percent of those persons were given an unconditional term of
imprisonment for a felony have been remanded in custody
while their cases were being investigated. Remand is common, too, in the case of accuseds who are subsequently to be
let off with suspended sentences for felonies committed:
about one-third of those who received a suspended term for a
felony in Oslo in 1955 had been detained during the period
of investigation. On the other hand, detention is comparatively rare in cases which are later disposed of by conditional
of the prosecution or dropped for lack of
suspension
249
evidence.

Bratholm's underlying data apparently parallel American studies in
showing a correlation between frequency of pretrial detention and
severity of ultimate disposition, but he seems to assume, quite plausibly,
248

See Crisis it Bail: I, at 960.

2 49

Bratholni, Arrest and Detention in Norway, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 336, 340-41

(1960).

CRISIS IN BAIL

that this shows not that pretrial detention causes more severe disposition but rather that more dangerous offenders are more likely both
to be detained and to receive a term of imprisonment. Furthermore,
even if we assume that some unfavorable dispositions of jailed prisoners are caused by pretrial detention, we have no data to help us
understand what particular aspect of detention is primarily responsible
for this prejudicial effect. It has been suggested that it
would be intriguing to see whether as simple-minded a precaution as assuring detained prisoners access to a shower,
a shave, and a clean shirt, and allowing them to enter the
courtroom not under guard but in the temporary custody
of their counsel, would have any perceptible effect on the
pretrial-post trial prison syndrome."'
How much this type of experiment as well as correction of other
abuses noted in the preceding subsection would reduce possible prejudice as reflected in dispositions statistics is now unknown and will
probably remain unknown.
By far the best attempt to control this and other variables which
might explain the more severe disposition of jail cases in terms other
than as a result of the pretrial jail experience is Rankin's 1964 study
in New York.25 1 Like the other studies, Rankin's has demonstrated
the strong correlation between pretrial jail status and a more unfavorable disposition; the following table summarizes this finding:
TABLE 1 [From Rankin] 25
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DETENTION & UNFAVORABLE DISPOSITION

Bail
Disposition
Sentenced to prison
Convicted without prison
Not convicted
Number of defendants

(M)
17
36
47
(374)

Jail
(%0)
64
9
27
(358)

Rankin has gone beyond other researchers, however, in introducing
controls for some of the more obvious variables which might explain
the association between detention and more unfavorable dispositions.
25OWald, Forward, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A

Statistical

Study, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 631, 637 (1964).
251 Rankin 641.
252Id. at 642. The sample was drawn from defendants arraigned on felony
charges in New York City during 1961-1962 and studied as part of the Vera Foundation's Manhattan Bail Project. Defendants are categorized as "bail" cases if they
were free for some or all of the time pending disposition, and were listed as "jail"
cases only if they were in jail all of the time from arrest until disposition. The entry
"convicted without prison" includes suspended sentence or choice of fine or prison.

1150

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.113:1125

Of greatest interest for our purposes are the controls for previous
criminal records, whether the bail required of the defendant was low
or high (over 500 dollars) and whether the defendant was represented
by private counsel or by court-assigned counsel. The first two variables
give some indication of the defendant's potential dangerousness, while
if court-assigned counsel were noticeably less effective than a private
attorney this too could have a significant effect on disposition. Each
of these three factors, considered separately, was found to be significantly related both to detention and to the likelihood of a prison
sentence; thus of defendants with a previous record, sixty-one percent
were detained in jail and sixty-three percent were sentenced to prison,
compared with thirty-eight percent and twenty-nine percent respectively for defendants with no previous record. "Therefore, it is
possible that detained defendants receive more prison sentences than
freed defendants not because they are detained but because the detention population contains a much higher proportion of defendants with
previous records than does the free population." - To hold such a
factor constant, the defendants were separated into two groups, "defendants with and defendants without previous records. Each group
of defendants was then studied separately to learn if differences in
disposition exist between bail and jail defendants." ' When one
considers the importance supposedly given to the presence or absence
of a prior criminal record in determining sentence, the results of
holding the factor of prior record constant are startling:
Among those with no record, fifty-nine per cent of the
jailed defendants received prison sentences, compared to ten
per cent of the bailed defendants. Among those with prior
records, eighty-one per cent of the jailed defendants were
sentenced to prison, compared to thirty-six per cent of the
bail defendants. Thus, jailed defendants were forty-nine and
forty-five per cent more likely to be sentenced to prison.
These percentages are no smaller than the original difference
of forty-seven per cent, which existed before the factor of
previous record was held constant." 5
Similar results were obtained when the factors of bail amount and
type of representation were controlled separately, and when all three
factors were held constant at once, the difference between disposition
of bail and jail defendants was only slightly reduced. "These findings," Rankin concludes, "provide strong support for the notion that
253

254

Id. at 646.
Ibid.

255 Id. at 647-48.
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a causal relationship exists between detention and unfavorable disposition." o Unless and until Rankin's data are disputed by later
empirical evidence, courts dealing with this problem should assume
that pretrial detention has a direct adverse effect on the disposition
of the accused's case.
3. The Due Process Dilemma
What, then, are the implications under due process theory of the
probably prejudicial effects of pretrial detention? We noted above
that, in the case of a good bail risk where the only cause of detention
was poverty, a very slight showing of prejudice should be sufficient to
tip the constitutional scales. The difficult problem is presented by a
case such as our hypothetical defendant's in which circumstances
besides indigency create risks for the community were the accused
released on bail. We have also noted that balancing of risks is typical
of due process adjudications, so that for the hypothetical defendant we
would be required to weigh the risk of prejudice to him as a result
of detention against the risk to the community that if released he
might abscond, commit further crimes, or injure the Government's
informer. A court might find that in the case of the hypothetical defendant the risks to the community were of sufficient magnitude to
take precedence, and therefore refuse to enlarge the defendant on his
own recognizance.
The difficulty with the application of this traditional due process
reasoning to the case of the hypothetical defendant, however, is that its
practical consequence is to deny release to a bad risk indigent while
still leaving open the possibility of release on bond for a bad risk rich
defendant. While the hypothetical defendant would remain in jail
because he constitutes a bad risk, successful professional criminals and
racketeers retain an absolute right to bail preserved by state guarantees,
probably by the eighth amendment, and in any event in federal cases
by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46. The question, therefore,
is whether such discrimination can survive the scrutiny of the equal
protection clause.
E. Equal Protection
In 1956 the Supreme Court decided in Griffin v. Illinois that indigents could not be deprived of the benefits of a state's system of
appellate review by a requirement that appellants purchase and submit
Mo Id. at

655.

1152

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.113:1125

a transcript 57 Subsequent cases have consolidated the rule' 5 5 and,
have within narrow confines extended it beyond appeal to collateral
proceedings 25 9 and to invalidate restrictions on indigent appeals which,
while they do not entirely cut off appellate review, limit its quality as
compared with the kind of review available to nonindigents" 6 It also
now seems clear that the Court in these equal protection adjudications
is beginning to engage in a kind of balancing of interests very similar
to that which has obtained in due process cases."' Indeed, the Griffin
rule probably rests on both clauses.262
The precise holding of Griffin is not particularly startling; ".
the more one considers the Griffin case in context, the more he becomes
persuaded that the result is squarely in the main current of [a] . . .
constitutional development which has been steadily unfolding for a
generation and more." 26 Nor should the decision have been entirely
Despite its generally
unexpected in the light of earlier case law."6
27351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Four justices found this requirement in both the due
process and equal protection clauses. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, whose vote was needed
to make up the majority, rested his concurrence only on equal protection grounds.
258E.g., Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (state cannot compel indigent to
post filing fee before supreme court would hear appeal); Eskridge v. Washington,
357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per curiam) (Griffin rule applied retroactively).
259 Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (state coram nobis) ; Smith v. Bennett,
365 U.S. 708 (1961) (filing fee for state habeas corpus).
(state must appoint counsel to
260 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
help indigent in first appeal whenever nonindigent could appeal and enjoy assistance
of counsel).
261 Compare Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420 (1963), with Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963), and Eskridge v. Washington, 357 U.S. 214 (1958). Outside
the Griffin area this same balancing has occurred. Thus even racial classifications
have been upheld when balanced against what was considered to be compelling wartime necessity, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); but the same clasification has been rejected
where the equities on the other side were deemed less compelling, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). And see Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Comm'rs,
330 U.S. 552 (1947) (apparently offense classification allowed to stand where it
was causing little prejudice in results). See generally Note, 16 STAir. L. REv. 394,
400-05 (1964).
262 Part of Mr. Justice Harlan's objections to Griffin rest on his view that if a
classification, here between rich and poor, is invidious, it would be so "in all cases,
and an invidious classification offends equal protection regardless of the seriousness
of the consequences." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 35 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Thus to approach the problem of the poor in criminal cases "in terms of
the Equal Protection Clause is, I submit, but to substitute resounding phrases for
analysis. . . . The real question . . . is whether or not the state rule . . . is
consistent with the requirements of fair procedure guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause." Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361, 363 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Court seems to lump both together, as it has done in some appeal cases,
see note 261 supra. If one takes the position that a balancing of state interests and
the seriousness of the consequences of an invidious classification is a factor to be
considered in equal protection cases, then it would appear to make little difference
which label is used. See Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 423-24 (1963): "Exact
equality is no prerequisite of equal protection . . .. [S]ome practical accommodation
must be made."
263 Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. CHi. L. REV. 151,
156 (1957).
264 Id. at 152-54.
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accepted equal protection label, the decision's rationale is closely related to the parallel due process development in the indigent counsel
cases.
What most attracted attention to Griffin, I think, was the potential power of its logic to open a score or more of Pandora's boxes. The
kind of sweeping language used by Mr. Justice Black in the opinion
that announced the Court's judgment has a profoundly unsettling
quality, for example, "There can be no equal justice when the kind of
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." 26 But
such language standing by itself cannot be taken too seriously. One
of the more fascinating aspects of the development of civil liberties in
American law has been its illogical compartmentalization. To name
only three examples which come immediately to mind: (1) the extensive development of the fourth amendment in the seizure of tangible
evidence with, until very recently, parallel underdevelopment of the
fourth amendment's restriction on seizure of the person; (2) our law
of right to counsel for indigents with parallel neglect of important
problems such as provision for adequate pretrial investigation; and
(3) the startling failure to apply to fact finding in the field of sentenc266
ing any of the due process controls used in the adjudication of guilt.

Experience should teach us, therefore, that the Griffin rationale
may well be restricted to the compartment in which it germinated. If
it is to escape, however, bail law certainly provides fertile soil. The
first suggestion that the Griffin rule might apply to the financial barriers of the bail system came from the dissenting justices in the case
itself:
. some [accused] can afford bail, some cannot. Why
fix bail at any reasonable sum if a poor man can't make it?
The Constitution requires the equal protection of the
law, but it does not require the States to provide equal
means for all defendants to avail themselves of such
financial
26 7
law
But the principle authority to date for the proposition that Griffin
might have application in the bail field is a pair of dicta of Mr. Justice
Douglas in the Bandy case.Y In deciding on Bandy's application for
release without financial security in 1960, Justice Douglas cited Griffin
265

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).

266 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).

But see Townsend v. Burke,

334 U.S. 736 (1948) (sentencing judge cannot crack jokes while imposing on uncounselled defendant long prison sentence premised on misinformation).
267 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 29 (1956).
268 Bandy v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 197, 198 (Douglas, Circuit justice,
1960) ; Bandy v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 11, 13 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1961).
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and asked: "Can an indigent be denied freedom, where a wealthy man
would not, because he does not happen to have enough property to
pledge for his freedom?" 269 He did not answer the question but noted
that: ".

. . I approach this application with the conviction that the

right to release is heavily favored and that the requirement of security
for the bond may, in a proper case, be dispensed with." 270
Seven months later, when application for release before him was
renewed, he took up his question again:
Further reflection has led me to conclude that no man
should be denied release because of indigence. Instead, under
our constitutional system, a man is entitled to be released
on "personal recognizance" where other relevant factors make
it reasonable to believe that he will comply with the orders
of the Court. 1
The Bandy case was an illustration of particularly aggravated
discrimination; 272 at the time Justice Douglas made this last statement, Bandy had been in jail pending appeal for more than two
years 27 3 During this time the trial court had certified that his appeal
was not taken in good faith; the Eighth Circuit then appointed a
lawyer to represent him on his motion for leave to appeal and four
months later dismissed the appeal as frivolous; the Supreme Court
vacated that judgment and remanded the case for hearing on appeal;
and nearly seven months after that remand the appeal had still not
been decided. Justice Douglas, however, declined to act in Bandy's
behalf because the application before him posed the same question as
that presented to the full Court in a pending petition for certiorari
from the refusal of the Eighth Circuit to reduce bail and release
The result was that Bandy spent
Bandy on his own recognizance.2
269

Bandy v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 197, 198 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1960).

270 Ibid.

Bandy v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct 11, 13 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1961).
See the history of the case in note 274 infra.
273 Bandy v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 11, 13 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1961).
274 Some indication of the complicated history of the Bandy case is required.
Bandy was convicted of filing and collecting refunds on false and fictitious income
tax returns. His first appearance in the reports was at 272 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1959)
(per curiam), where it is said that he had already been convicted and the trial judge
had certified that his appeal was not taken in good faith. The court of appeals
appointed a lawyer to represent Bandy on his motion for leave to appeal in forma
pauperis. This was on December 10, 1959. On April 25, 1960, the court denied his
motion to appeal in forma pauperis and dismissed his appeal as frivolous, 278 F.2d
214 (8th Cir. 1960) (per curiain). Bandy then filed a petition for certiorari in the
Supreme Court Meanwhile he was in jail, for not surprisingly the court of appeals
had denied him bail; given the view it took of the case-that the appeal was frivolous
271
272

-it

had no option but to deny bail, see FED. R. Cmm. P. 46(a) (2).

Pending dis-

position of the petition for certiorari, Bandy filed an application for bail with the
circuit justice for the Eighth Circuit, Justice Whittaker, which was denied on July 29,
1960. Always the diligent litigant, Bandy then filed a similar application with Justice
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another three and a half months in prison until the petition was
Douglas. Justice Douglas, although "most reluctant to take contrary action" to that
of Justice Whittaker, made inquiry of the Solicitor General, who stated that the
petition for certiorari presented "substantial questions of law." Justice Douglas
therefore granted bail in the amount of $5,000. Bandy v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct.
25 (Douglas, Justice, 1960). (At some point while the Eighth Circuit case was being
litigated, Bandy was moved to a jail in Idaho, in connection with a pending prosecution in that district, which may account for the fact that Justice Douglas, who is
circuit justice for the Ninth Circuit, acted in all subsequent reported individual
applications.)
As Bandy was indigent, however, he was unable to post bond and he filed another
application with Justice Douglas, this time requesting release on "personal recognizance" pending certiorari. While this application was pending, on December 5,
1960, the Court granted Bandy's petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment, and
remanded the case for a hearing of the appeal. 364 U.S. 477 (1960) (per curiam).
On the same day, Justice Douglas decided the application for release and issued what
has erroneously been called his "first" Bandy opinion. After speculating on the right
of indigents to release, Justice Douglas denied the application without prejudice to
another application in the courts below for a hearing as to whether or not Bandy
posed a substantial risk of absconding were he to be released without bond. 81 Sup.
Ct. 197 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1960).
Apparently the court of appeals refused to reduce the $5,000 bail figure previously
set by Justice Douglas, and while the appeal was pending in the Eighth Circuit,
Bandy filed a new battery of petitions for certiorari in the Supreme Court, one of
which asked the Court to review the judgment of the court of appeals refusing to
reduce bail and release him on his own recognizance. He also renewed his application
for similar release before Mr. Justice Douglas, and on June 28, 1961, Justice Douglas
acted upon this application in his so-called "second" Bandy opinion, in which he
reached the conclusion "that no man should be denied release because of indigence."
82 Sup. Ct 11, 13 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1961). Although his reason for denying
without prejudice the earlier release application was because the Government's claim
that the petitioner posed a risk "troubles me," 81 Sup. Ct. at 198, he now stated
(82 Sup. Ct. at 13) :
I reject the Government's argument, in opposition to these applications,
that Bandy is a "poor risk." That argument was not made when release was
sought on a $5000 bond. No reason is now put forward which makes it more
relevant to release without security than to release on bond. The showing
in this respect does not overcome our heavy presumption favoring freedom.
However, Justice Douglas declined to act because Bandy had asked for the same
relief in his petition for certiorari, and if "the relief were granted by a single
Justice, it would make the petition for certiorari moot." Ibid. As the petition
for certiorari was not denied until October 9, 368 U.S. 852 (1961) (two petitions from
Bandy's then pending Ninth Circuit case were also denied on the same day), Bandy
spent another summer in jail.
The basis for Justice Douglas' abstention is a possible conflict between Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a) (2), which clearly gives "the circuit justice" the
power to grant bail pending certiorari (query whether Justice Douglas was "circuit
justice" in this Eighth Circuit case, but he apparently assumed he was within the
rule), and the decision in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), that the denial of a motion
to reduce bail is a final, appealable decision which can be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari. The concurring opinion of Justices Jackson and Frankfurter
in Stack v. Boyle includes a lengthy analysis of the various sources of the power of
a Justice to grant bail, id. at 7, 11-18. The Court is explicit in not determining "the
power of a . . . Justice to fix bail pending disposition of a petition for certiorari"
on the bail issue, id. at 4 n.2. Justices Jackson and Frankfurter would apparently
restrict Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a) (2) to petitions for certiorari on
the merits and not allow the circuit justice to act individually on bail if a petition
for certiorari involving bail was pending, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 18 (1951). This
view, which Justice Douglas apparently accepted, not only does violence to the literal
wording of rule 46(a) (2) but seems wrong on the merits. It invites precisely the
kind of delay which occurred in Bandy, where a petition was filed during vacation. If
the Jackson-Frankfurter position prevails, then a petitioner has no remedy at all
during the summer and a less speedy one at other times. The purpose of rule 46(a) (2)
is to avoid just such a contingency.
In any event, Justice Douglas had other courses of action open to him besides
outright denial of Bandy's application. He dealt with the same question differently
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denied,175 followed by nearly six months more until the appellate
process was finally terminated.2 7
I have difficulty understanding why in this case Justice Douglas
thought he should not act, and it is even harder to justify the denial
of certiorari by the full Court. The ambiguity in the power of an
individual Justice to bail in these circumstances which restrained
Justice Douglas 171 was noted but not decided in Stack v. Boyle and
discussed at length in that case in a concurring opinion by Mr. Justice
Jackson."
Thus aside from the important substantive question raised
by Justice Douglas, the Bandy petition posed an important question
of prompt access to bail which only the Court could resolve and which
needed to be resolved.27 9 The Griffin-bail question, moreover, was put
to the Court again in the same case by a dissent of Justice Douglas
when the Court denied a later application by Bandy, which Justice
Douglas would have treated as an application for recognizance release.2 80 One is not supposed to draw conclusions on the merits from
in Stack v. Boyle itself, referring the individual bail application to the full Court for
prompt disposition. 342 U.S. at 4. In 1955 Justice Harlan faced the problem in
Noto v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 255 (Harlan, Circuit Justice, 1955). He expressed similar concern because "my disposition of the application necessarily involves
prejudging the very questions with which the Court must deal should the petition
for certiorari be granted." But instead of denying the application, "I have consulted
my brethren and have their approval of my considering this interim application."
Id. at 257. He then proceeded to reduce bail to $10,000. The Court apparently
did not regard justice Harlan's action as having mooted the petition, for it later
granted it and reduced bail to the same amount as that previously set on the individual
application. 351 U.S. 902 (1956). justice Douglas apparently used the same circulation device in another bail case before Bandy, Cohen v. United States, No. 795,
1961 Term, October 21, 1960 [sic] (Douglas, Circuit Justice), see Note, 112 U. PA.
L. RFv. 981, 997 n.114 (1964), and used it again later in a comparable situation. In
McGee v. Eyman, 83 Sup. Ct. 230 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962), he was individually
presented with an application for stay of execution while a petition for certiorari
on the same subject was concurrently before the Court. He proceeded to decide it
after circulating the petition "to each of my Brethren." Id. at 231.
275 Bandy v. United States, 368 U.S. 852 (1961).
276The appeal was decided on November 15, 1961, 296 F.2d 882 (8th Cir.)
(conviction affirmed), and the petition for certiorari to review this decision denied
on March 26, 1962, 369 U.S. 831.
277 See note 274 supra.
See discussion in note 274 supra.
278 342 U.S. 1, 7, 11-18 (1951).
279 The question may not come up again, for in the present state of the law any
well advised petitioner denied bail in the court of appeals will file an individual application with the circuit justice, and only if it is denied will he follow with a petition
for certiorari, thereby gaining two bites at the apple. The proposed changes in the
federal rules have not dealt with the problem. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, COMMITTEE ON"

RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES (2d Prelim. Draft 1964).
280 See Bandy v. United States, 369 U.S. 815, decided March 19, 1962. This was
a "motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus," and Justice Douglas'
dissent would have treated "this application as one for release on personal recognizance," and he makes the statement that "as of the date of this application the
appeal had not been disposed of." But the appeal had been decided months before
and the following week the Court denied the petition for certiorari from that decision.
See note 275 mipra.
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a denial of certiorari, but under these circumstances the suspicion
lingers that at least for the time being the other Justices are not in a
hurry to indorse Justice Douglas' dictum on the applicability of
Griffin to bail.
Be that as it may, seldom has a dictum born in chambers under
such circumstances, and apparently stillborn at that, travelled so far
so fast. It has been discussed sympathetically by the Chief Justice in
an address to the National Bail Conference,"8 1 cited by the Attorney
General's committee ' and in the proposed revision of the federal
rules governing bail,2s' and cited and discussed in the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia.2 8 In the recent District of Columbia
case of Alston v. United States, the issue was apparently squarely
posed. 2 85 The court of appeals had previously set bond at a figure
defendant could not afford, and when the Government moved to
postpone argument and this was granted, Chief Judge Bazelon took
the position that the postponement should be conditioned upon the
court sua sponte reducing bond to an amount defendant could afford.
Pending trial Alston had been released on a one hundred dollar
personal bond on recommendation of the District of Columbia Bail
Project, and he had "long-standing ties to the community, excellent
prospects for employment on release, and no prior criminal record." 288
Thus Alston was precisely the kind of defendant Justice Douglas envisaged as constitutionally entitled to release. 8 7 A divided court
of appeals, however, declined to act on the suggestion.
Probably the applicability of Griffin to the bail situation will in
large measure depend upon the kind of analysis which is made of the
purposes of the bail administration. I have already noted288 the difficulty of this determination. In part, certainly, bail administration
serves the legitimate objective of compelling appearance in court, but
the method used to achieve this purpose is one that necessarily prejudices the poor.
281

NATIONAL BAIL CONFERENCE 6, 8.

282 ATTY GEN. REP. 85-86.
283 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, TO RULES OF CRImINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED
STATES DIsTRIcT COURTs, COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

52-53 (2d Prelim. Draft 1964).

See

also Sullivan, Proposed Ride 46 and the Right to Bail, 31 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 919,

929-32 (1963).

2
" Pelletier v. United States, 343 F.2d 322, 323 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam)
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring) ; Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d 698, 699, 701 (D.C.

Cir. 21963).

SAlston v. United States, 343 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per curiam).
286 Id. at 346 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
287 Bandy v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 11, 13 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1961).
See note 271 mipra.

288 See text at pp. 1136-37 supra.
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Given the result of substantial discrimination, the mere existence
of a legitimate state objective does not preclude the applicability of the
Griffin rule. In the Griffin line of cases, too, the legitimate purpose
of the invalidated practices was evident and conceded: to control frivolous appeals and needless expense to the state. The state's position
was succinctly stated by Mr. Justice White in his dissent in Draper,
where he noted that the decision in that case "severely limits the power
of the States to avoid undue expense in dealing with criminal appeals.
It places their appellate processes in an unflexible procedural straitjacket." 289 Presumably it was not entirely arbitrary for a state to
conclude that frivolous appeals were an unjustified burden upon appellate machinery; that the cost of an appeal, much of which consists
of legal fees and the expense of a transcript is a significant deterrent to
frivolous appeals by nonindigents; and that as indigents are not subject
to this self-regulating mechanism, they will impose a heavy burden
upon the state2 9 unless their appeals are subject to some form of
control. If this control means that the poor are denied appeal, 9 1 or
restricted in their access to appellate courts, 2 92 it is an unfortunate
by-product of a rule justified as the most practicable method of achieving a legitimate end. Presumably the state could limit frivolous
appeals by screening out indigent and nonindigent appeals according
to a common standard, as the Court suggested in Draper2 9 3 and as
is required in federal in forma pauperis procedure. 94 But such
screening is an expensive and time-consuming task, itself imposing on
courts a major burden which they cannot delegate. 295 Screening,
moreover, is frought with risks of great injustice, for the Court's
opinion in Draper stresses the limitations of a hearing on an inadequate record,2 96 which is the only way to screen if the screening procedure itself is not to turn into a full hearing on the merits.
289 Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 509 (1963)
(state practice used to
screen applications for transcripts invalid, even though transcript not a prerequisite
to appeal, where nonindigents could obtain more complete appellate review with
transcripts).
290 "We all know that the overwhelming percentage of in forma pauperis appeals

are frivolous. Statistics of this Court show that over 96% of the petitions filed here
are of this variety." Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
29

1E.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

22E.g., Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963).

at 499.
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962)

2931d.

294

(indigent's appeal can be

held frivolous for purpose of denying certificate of good faith for appellate review

only if appeal would be dismissed as frivolous in case of nonindigent appellant; Ellis
v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958) (per curiam).
295 Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)
(delegation to "state officer outside of
the judicial system" of final power to foreclose appeal by refusing to order transcript
invalid).
296 372 U.S. 487, 498-500 (1963).
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One would suppose that this kind of argument would find a
sympathetic ear in a Court which knows first hand from its own
certiorari practice the burden and limitations of screening cases.
That it was rejected means that we can paraphrase the Griffin rule
as follows: at least as to appeals, a state cannot seek a legitimate
objective by means which result in substantial discrimination against
the poor even if the only alternatives result in a considerable added
burden in expense and judicial administration.
An important parallel between the equal protection cases and the
bail problem involves delegation of power by the judiciary to control
enjoyment of a basic right. Lane v. Brown2 97 invalidated an Indiana
statute by which, in post-conviction procedure, the transcript required
for an appeal from denial of a writ of coram nobis could be obtained
by an indigent only in the discretion of the public defender. A unanimous Court"2 9 found the vice in this procedure to be that it "confers
upon a state officer outside the judicial system power to take from an
indigent all hope of any appeal . .

.9

*..,

In bail practice the

bondsman-not a state officer and often of questionable reputation even
as a private person-is vested with somewhat similar discretion in the
administration of the eighth amendment.
It will be recalled that the hypothetical defendant's only cash
resource is the forty dollars taken from him on arrest. Let us suppose
that the police returned this to him, that his sister managed to raise an
additional sixty dollars, and that a court impressed with his need to
search for his witnesses reduced his bail to 1,000 dollars. In theory
he should now get out in a jurisdiction where the fee is ten per cent.
We should note at the outset that if this theory prevailed and the hypothetical defendant goes free, he stands to gain nothing financially by
waiting around for trial. Whether he waits or absconds, he will still
owe his sister sixty dollars and be out his own forty dollars. The only
person who stands to lose from his flight is the bondsman, whose
security is his civil cause of action against a missing indigent.
Because of this risk and the bondsman's role as a private businessman free to accept or reject customers, the mere fact that the
hypothetical defendant's bond has been reduced to 1,000 dollars and
that he has 100 dollars in cash is no guarantee that he will get out.
In practice his release is entirely up to the bondsman, who may be
satisfied with the 100 dollar fee,"' 0 or demand an additional under-the477 (1963).
298 Justices Harlan and Clark concurred on due process grounds. Id. at 485-86.
299 372 U.S. at 485.
300The likelihood that this would happen depends in major part on the jurisdiction's forfeiture policy; where the rate of collections on forfeiture is high, the
297372 U.S.
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table sweetener,30 1 or require collateral less than, equal to or greater
than the amount of the bond, °2 or simply refuse to do business with
the defendant at all.3 03 Thus when a court decides that 1,000 dollars
bail is sufficient, in fact it does not know what it is requiring of the
defendant, who may still be denied all release or have to put up anything from 100 dollars to the full amount of the bond.3 4 As Judge
Wright has noted:
The effect of such a system is that the professional bondsmen
The court
hold the keys to the jail in their pockets. . .
and the commissioner are relegated to the relatively unimportant chores of fixing the amount of bail.30 5
What the government gets out of this shoddy business is of
critical importance to resolution of the constitutional question. If a
requirement of collateral is probably close to one hundred percent, for example in
Detroit. FREED & WALD 26. In New York most bondsmen require collateral although
"occasional exceptions are made when the defendant has 'strong ties in the city and
a good record." New York Bail Study 704. One New York bondsman stated: "If
a person comes in and I don't know him or his lawyer, we look for collateral; if
they don't have it, we don't bother with them." FREED & WALD 27.
Defendants who probably have the least difficulty obtaining release for the stated
premium are members of criminal syndicates, where provision of bond is part of "the
smooth operation of the criminal enterprise," with the security to the bondsman not
the resources of the individual defendant but the syndicate. FREED & WALD 35,
quoting a 1964 New York Bar Report.
Conversely, defendants held on nominal bail may have considerable difficulty.
In an opinion which gives considerable information on the mechanics and economics
of the bonding business in New York the court noted that "it is generally the minor
or low bail offender, whose even temporary detention is not justified by the crime
charged, who finds himself" not solicited by bondsmen "because his low bail is
unprofitable." People v. Smith, 196 Misc. 304, 307, 91 N.Y.S.2d 490, 494 (1949).
301 On the frequency of illegal overcharging see FREED & WALD 33; Philadelphia
Bail Study 1047. Bondsmen may also condition their services on other factors, for
example, hiring a particular lawyer with whom they have an illegal tie-in arrangement
Ibid.
302 FREEa & WALD 26-27; New York Bail Study 704; see note 300 .rpra.
3 03
FREED & WAD 33-34 & n.46:

Estimates by individual bondsmen respecting the percentage of cases they
reject vary from 5% in Baltimore and Greenville, South Carolina, 25% in
Denver, Colorado, Champaign-Urbana, Illinois and Jackson, Mississippi; 45%
in Asheville, North Carolina and 50% in Philadelphia, Elizabeth City, North
Carolina and Atlanta, to 60-85% in Birmingham. These figures presumably
do not include indigents who cannot raise the money to call a bondsman in
the first place.
"Civil rights demonstrators have reported extraordinary difficulties in finding bondsmen to bail them out in some southern cities." Ibid. See also Hairston v. United
States, 343 F.2d 313, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (Chief Judge Bazelon's
dissent referring to refusal to write bonds in the District of Columbia).
304 The only court reports I have seen which give any indication that judges
are aware of this problem have come from the District of Columbia, and those in
recent years. See, e.g., Hairston v. United States, 343 F.2d 313, 315-17 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (per curiam) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting); Pannell v. United States 320 F.2d
698, 699-702 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (concurring opinion and opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
305 Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Wright, J.,
concurring).
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defendant absconds the government is entitled to a forfeiture of the
bond; the cost of returning the fugitive to the jurisdiction when he is
located elsewhere may be borne by the bondsman. In the latter event,
the practice is to remit at least part of the forfeiture. But while a few
cities have followed a policy of strict collections on foreitures, "collection of forfeited bonds has often been lax or tinged with scandal"; .06
probably the fullest examination remains that done more than ten years
ago in the PhiladelphiaBail Study, which found a collection rate in
307
1950 of twenty per cent on forfeited and unremitted bonds.
In determining collection policy, the government is caught in a
vicious circle. The objective of the bail system is to get defendants out
of detention, but tough forfeiture and collection policies increase the
bondsman's risk and force him to be more selective, 8 " thereby magnifying the problem of presumably unconstitutional delegation of bail
setting and increasing the proportion of defendants held in jail. Bondsmen, however, have threatened to go on "strike" and in 1961 and
1964 in New York in part carried out this threat, refusing to write
bonds except on one hundred per cent collateral in bankbooks or real
estate.30 9 These strikes were "said to be in retaliation for tighter
enforcement policies of forfeitures instituted by 'uncooperative' district
attorneys" and the effect in 1961 was "overcrowding the city's detention facilities and jailing numerous minor offenders for want of small
bonds ....

," "

A New York bar committee has noted that a

concerted strike "would have a genuinely chaotic effect upon the City
prisons in very short order." 11 Nothing could more graphically
demonstrate the extent to which the important governmental function
of regulating pretrial detention has been delegated to private business.
An additional factor affecting government collection policy is
that not all bonds are written by professional bondsmen. In Philadelphia in 1950 forty-five per cent came from private sources.3 1 2

Un-

like commercial bond, private bail presumably does put some pressure
on the defendant not to abscond, and one would expect what was in
30

6FREED & WALD 30.

o7 PhiladelphiaBail Study 1061-62.
308 For methods of selection
see FREED & WALD 33: e.g., "bondsmen generally
avoid narcotics defendants ('they usually don't wake up on time to get to court'),
prostitutes ('they have no roots'), forgers ('they travel too much'), scofflaws, and
alleged subversives ('bad publicity'). Because of the speed with which the bondsman's decision is made, it is often based on pure intuition." Compare Philadelphia
Bail Study 1065-66 (bondsman has little flexibility within system to protect himself
against bad risks). See also Crisis in Bail: I, at 997-98.
809 FREED & WALD 27.
310 Id. at 28.
11 Id. at 27.
3 12
PhiladelphiaBail Study 1060.
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fact found in the Philadelphia study: that the forfeiture rate for private
bond was less than half that of professional bond313 A tough collection policy, however, appears to drive private bail off the market. In
Detroit, which has prided itself on one hundred per cent collections,
ninety-five per cent of the bail was written by surety companies, and
when Philadelphia instituted more vigorous collection policies in the
fall of 1952 the proportion of bonds posted by private sources declined
sharply.3 14 In most large cities it is probable that this result has already
occurred; in New York it was reported that almost no private bail is
being posted. 15 It is ironic that the form of bail one would suppose
to have the most deterrent value has been or is being destroyed.
All the available evidence indicates that under present conditions
the risk of absconding is low. The four district survey of the Attorney General's Committee found the rate of failure to appear ranged
from one to seven per cent: 316
Many such instances presumably involved minor technical
defaults. It is thought that comparatively few of them were
cases of "bail jumping" in which
the defendant disappeared
31
to avoid trial or punishment. 7
The Committee then added: "Thus qualified, these 'failure' figures
may be thought to raise a question whether pre-trial liberty involves
a substantial enforcement problem." '18 The forfeiture rate in the
PhiladelphiaBail Study was two and a half per cent, and a survey of
other cities showed rates as low and usually much lower. 319 Furthermore, most of the forfeitures involved petty cases; the two and a half
per cent dropped to 1.35 per cent when gambling, liquor and traffic
offenses were eliminated. 320 Other more recent data is consistent with
these findings.3 '
The claims that bondsmen provide any significant function in
policing those on bail and finding them once they have absconded
seem frivolous to me. There is no evidence that they actually perform
any significant custodial function, and it is unreasonable to expect
them to do so. As for finding fugitives, it is the police and the FBI
Id. at 1063, figure 4.
at 1060-61.
New
York Bail Study 703-04.
31
ATr'Y Gmr. REP. 129-30.
317 Id. at 130.
318 Ibid.
319 Philadelphfa Bail Study 1061-62.
32 0 Id. at 1062.
321 For example in the Eastern District of Michigan, 1962: 553 defendants released,
eight defaults; District of Columbia: bail jumping "in a very small proportion" of
cases. FREm & WALD 29.
313

314 Id.
315
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who have the communications network necessary for this task, not the
bondsmen 22 What does happen is that the government receives
partial remuneration for the cost of returning a fugitive once he has
been found from forfeitures and from the bondsman's services. The
equal-protection-on-appeal cases make short shrift of any claim that
the petty financial economies which thus accrue to the state can justify
the discrimination implicit in the system.
These data suggest a compelling case for the application of the
Griffin rule to bail. Because bail denial both affects the quality of the
original trial and imposes imprisonment before there has even been a
first finding of guilt, the discrimination is more aggravated than at
the stage of appeal with which Griffin was concerned. The major
factor which distinguishes bail from the Griffin cases is the unknown
of what would happen if all defendants now detained pending trial
were instead released during this period. It is impossible to determine
whether the low forfeiture rates for bailed defendants would prove to
be a reliable index for the rate of absconding to be expected from
presently jailed defendants. There is no reason, however, to expect
an alarming rise. The principal deterrent against flight is the
danger of being caught again and suffering an added detriment as a
result. If this is reinforced by the provision of explicit criminal
sanctions for flight " and a policy against release a second time of
defendants who have previously absconded, it should be sufficient
to control the problem. Provision could be made for additional protection in cases of unusually high risk: supervision of the defendant
3 24
by a probation officer, or a system of daily or weekly reporting,
or advancing the date of trial for the particular defendant to shorten
the duration of the risk period. Failure of a defendant to comply with
such conditions or his use of unreasonable delaying tactics in going
to trial could then be made the basis for subsequent detention.
3=2 Philadelphia Bail Study

1067.

323 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1958) (failure to surrender within thirty days of
forfeiture of bail-five years if original crime felony, one year if misdemeanor);
MINN. SrAT. ANN.

§ 609.49 (1964)

(felony defendant who fails to appear within

three days-one year and $1,000). See the discussion of these statutes in Philadelphia
Bail Study 1068. 5For a proposed statute making nonappearance a criminal offense,

see id. at 1073 n.1 7; the statute

provides a severe penalty for fugitives who do not appear within 30 days of
the time required; proscribes "judge-jumping" by providing a lesser penalty

for those who do not appear on the day required but do appear within 30

days; protects the defendant when he has a lawful excuse for non-appearance,
but makes proof of non-appearance constitute prima facie evidence of a

violation; and protects both the state and the defendant by requiring fingerprinting before release and by appropriate notice provisions.
Id. at 1073-74.
324See Sica v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 669, 670 (Douglas, Circuit Justice,
1962) (Sica's bail pending appeal conditioned on his staying in the district and
"personally reporting each day, excluding Sundays and holidays, to the United States

Marshal

. .").
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It should be recalled that although other major constitutional
reforms in the last decade-search and seizure, right to counsel, and
Griffin itself-were accompanied by predictions of dire and unmanageable consequences, there is no evidence that an accommodation
may not in fact be achieved. If in the case of bail reform experience
should prove that the rate of absconding rises unreasonably, a solution
should be sought within the rationale of the eighth amendment's
policy of pretrial release, through measures which are applicable to
rich and poor alike, and not by financial discriminations.
IV. PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

it will be recalled that Mr. Justice Douglas' Bandy dictum con-

cluded that "a man is entitled to be released on 'personal recognizance'
where other relevant factors make it reasonable to believe that he
will comply with the orders of the Court." 825 Resting as it does on
Griffin, the statement is puzzling because it would still leave the
indigent at a substantial disadvantage vis-A-vis the nonindigent, who
would continue to have an absolute right to release on bond if he
could afford the price whether or not it was "reasonable to believe
that he will comply with the orders of the court." As we have seen,
Griffin has been extended to bar limitations on the quality of appellate
review made available to indigents compared to that afforded nonindigents. 26 If Griffin is applicable to the bail situation, as I believe
it should be, I would suppose that the whole doctrine is applicable and
that selective detention of indigents by standards not applied to nonindigents would be invalid.
Nonetheless Justice Douglas' suggestion has inspired a number

of recommendations 12 7 and legislative proposals " for reform. While
at first these were put forward in a form which would make them
applicable only to indigents, the logic of Griffin is leading to consideration of a system of preventive detention which would be appliBandy v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 11, 13 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1961).
See notes 260, 261 supra.
327 E.g., AT'Y GEN. RzsP. 76 (recommending "release of the accused on his own
recognizance without additional financial securities, in proper cases . . .Y.
=8E.g., S. 1357, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), which would revise bail practices
in accordance with a congressional finding that "persons reasonably expected to appear
at future proceedings should not be deprived of their liberty solely because of their
825
826

financial inability to post bail .

.

.

."

§ 2(a) (2).

Provision is made for use of a

wide range of alternatives to traditional bail, § 3(a), and provides for an appeal
from a decision on release (presumably made by a commissioner) to the district court,
an appeal which emphasizes the delay difficulty by the requirement that it be decided
within ten days. It would also provide that time spent in custody pending conviction
would be credited against any sentence of imprisonment imposed. § 4. This is a
much needed reform; for a discussion of current federal statutes on the subject and
their inadequacies see Short v. United States, 344 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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cable to rich and poor alike. In a Senate speech on March 4, 1965,
Senator Ervin stated:
*
*

.

.

[M]any commentators on the American bail system
recommend that the present laws providing an absolute

right to bail should be discarded, that release should be
optional, and that procedures for a prompt review of bail
decisions should be developed. It is argued that these
modifications would not only be more effective in protecting
society from dangerous offenders who can meet financial
bail requirements or flee the jurisdiction of the court, but
would also provide a more reliable bail system for releasing
3 29
persons whose community ties qualify them for release.

This position, of course, rests upon an interpretation of the eighth
amendment squarely opposed to that advanced in this article. Senator
Ervin took the position that the eight amendment "does not appear
to confer an absolute right to bail," 330 citing Carlson v. Landon, 1
which I have discussed above and which does not appear to be very
persuasive authority for that position. 3 2 Aside from the constitutional question, however, it will be useful to examine the concept of
preventive detention on its possible merits as sound policy.
Such proposals have all the seductive appeal of the maxim that
of prevention is worth a pound of cure, but the impropriety
ounce
an
of the application of that maxim to a democratic system of criminal
law should give one pause. Behind the proposals are certain
assumptions:
(a) that the contingencies which are to justify detention are
sufficiently narrow and precise to be capable of administration as
meaningful legal standards;
(b) that we have the ability to predict the probability of occurrence of these contingencies in individual cases;
(c) that there is or will be an investigatory structure which can
develop the facts necessary for decision;
(d) that there is or will be an adjudicatory system before a
person competent to make the necessary prediction, with right to
counsel, hearing, an opportunity to contest the facts and their application to law, and provision for appellate review;
3993 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1965).
30 Ibid.
331342 U.S. 524 (1952).
3 See Crisis it; Bail: I, at 979.
329 111 CONG. REc.
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(e) as time is of the essence in a process where even a day's
delay is important and five or six weeks moots the entire issue, that
the fact-finding, adjudication, and appellate review can all be accomplished with great dispatch.
A. Standards for Detention
In determining the substantive standards which might be proposed for preventive detention, lack of precision is as much a vice as
is vagueness in the substantive criminal law. A standard which provides merely for detention if the accused is deemed a danger to the
community 3 3 or if it would not be "proper" "' to release him gives no
guidance to trial judges, permits no effective appellate review and
invites abuse by allowing the trial judge to indulge his own feelings
and prejudices.
More specific grounds usually advanced as possible bases for
preventive detention include the risk of nonappearance for trial, the
danger that the accused will commit a crime while on pretrial release,
the danger that he will intimidate witnesses, harm a complaining witness or attempt to influence a juror, or anticipation that the community would be incensed were the accused not locked up pending
trial. I would reject this last proposed standard as inconsistent with
our whole philosophy of accusatorial procedure. The community is
always likely to be intolerant of due process and equal protection in
cases where feelings run high, and I see no more reason to give in
to the temporary popular feelings in this situation than in any other.
As Mr. Justice Douglas said in a case involving bail pending appeal:
". .. equal justice under law requires that bail not be denied even
a notorious law-violator if he has a substantial question to be resolved
on appeal." 8
The risks of flight and criminality need further narrowing if
they are to be used as standards. What kind of nonappearance for
trial, for example, should warrant detention? The PhiladelphiaBail
Study, as we have noted, found that out of an overall forfeiture rate
of two and one-half per cent, most failures to appear resulted from
flight pending charges of minor crimes. 36 In view of the strength of
3
33 Rehman v. California, 85 Sup. Ct 8 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1964) (denying
bail pending appeal where state court held appellant's enlargement would present
"an immediate, clear and present danger imperiling, jeopardizing, and threatening
the health, safety, and welfare of the community"); D.C. CIL R. 33(f), cited in
Hairston v. United States, 343 F.2d 313, 316 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam)
(Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (providing for denial of bail pending appeal when "the
safety of the community would be jeopardized").
334 ATr'y G x. REP. 76.
335 Cohen v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 8, 9 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1961).
386 Philadelphia Bail Study 1061-62; see p. 1162 supra.
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the policy against detention, is bringing a gambler or a prostitute to
trial of sufficient importance to warrant detention if there is a finding of
a risk of nonappearance? Second, most nonappearance is temporary.
In Philadelphia a common complaint was that defendants on bail did
not appear on the day scheduled if they were slated to appear before
a "hanging judge," but instead would show up soon thereafter. Such
judge-jumping is a nuisance and complicates court calendars; is it
enough to warrant detention? One of the Vera Foundation's New
York studies examined the reasons for nonappearance given in the 785
cases in 1963 in which actions were instituted for remission of
forfeitures. 33 7 The most frequent reasons for missing court were:
illness (32.4 percent); forgot or confused on date (22.8 percent);
incarcerated elsewhere on that date (14.3 percent); problems in
notification of the defendant of the date (11.1 percent); and was in
court on scheduled day but, inter alia, went to wrong room, or appeared
at wrong time (9.2 percent) .13 All these were technically instances
of nonappearance; that they were not, however, regarded as serious
may be seen from the fact that remission was not opposed by the Dis3 39
trict Attorney in 96.3 percent of the cases.
The narrowness and precision with which the standards are
stated will to some extent avoid the temptation to base a case for
detention on what Chief Judge Bazelon has called "the government's
conclusory allegations." 340 Unless the standards are sufficiently narrow to require proof of particular circumstances which set the individual case apart from the general run of cases, there are no real limits
on detention. Judges in bail cases which come up on appeal where
denial of bail is discretionary frequently refer to a defendant's prior
criminal record or the fact that he faces the probability of a substantial
prison sentence as grounds for denying bail in a particular case. But
a high proportion of defendants share one or both of these characteristics.34' Unless something more precise than such variations on
the themes of bad reputation and bad prospects is required, probably
a majority of all defendants would be detainable and the decision from
among this group of whom to detain and whom to free would turn
337A Summary of the Reasons Given by Defendants for not Appearing in Court
(Vera Foundation, New York, 1964) (unpublished mimeo).
338 Id. at 8.

339 Id.at 4.
340 Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d 698, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
341 See, for example, the concern of Judge Clark, who denied bail in a case
where an applicant with a long criminal record, "many incentives to skip bail," and
"little to hold him," but who added: "I do not want to get into the position of saying
that a charge as a multiple offender automatically renders the accused ineligible for
bail." United States v. Wilson, 257 F.2d 796, 797 (2d Cir. 1958) (Clark, J., sitting
alone).
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not on legal standards relevant to the state's legitimate objective but
rather on the vagaries of judicial temperament or the masking of
illicit objectives, for example, to give the defendant "a taste of jail."
These considerations are particularly acute in determining what
standards to use to evaluate the risk of nonappearance. Any defendant
who thinks he is going to be convicted and sentenced to prison, an
entirely subjective contingency we cannot estimate with any certainty,
has an incentive to flee. Any defendant who is free has the means to
accomplish flight-all he has to do is to go, hitch-hiking if he has no
better means of transportation. To find as facts, therefore, "that
there is considerable motivation for these defendants to flee the court's
jurisdiction and that they have ample means to accomplish this purpose" " is almost entirely meaningless, for the facts found fail to
distinguish the case being decided from most others. More superficially plausible would be suggestions to use the extent of defendant's
ties to the community as a measure. It should be noted, though, that
this is merely an hypothesis; to my knowledge there'is no data to
allow us to assess the comparative risk of flight of a no-ties-to-thecommunity defendant and a strong-ties defendant. More important,
even if the no-ties defendant is three times as likely to flee, it proves
very little, for only around one out of thirty or forty defendants is
likely to flee in any event.3 ' The kind of reasoning that underlies
the tie-to-the-community standard is premised on statistical sleight of
hand. If, being a pipe smoker, I am informed that pipe smokers are
three times more likely to get some dread disease than nonsmokers,
this sounds like black news indeed. But if the incidence of the
disease in question is only one per one hundred population, my chances
of succumbing are still very small.
An added problem with a standard such as the defendant's reliability and roots in his community is that in application it will
inevitably result in discrimination against the poor and, indirectly, the
Negro. One aspect of that fifth of the population that might be considered as living in poverty is that relatively speaking it is rootless.
An accused drawn from this stratum is less likely than the average
individual to own property or to have a job and more likely to be a
"drifter." Because law enforcement at the police discretion level also
operates discriminatorily against the poor, an indigent is also more
likely to have a criminal arrest record for conduct which would not
produce such a record in a better class neighborhood, for example,
for "corner-lounging." Our magistrates, justices of the peace, and
342

Ward v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 1063, 1066 (Frankfurter, Circuit Justice,

1956).
343

See p. 1162 supra.
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lower judiciary who set bail today are conditioned by long custom to
seeing the poor denied pretrial release because they are poor. Any
reform has difficulty uprooting such ingrained habits of procedure.
To permit preventive detention because an accused has shallow roots
or is vaguely dangerous is to invite perpetuation of the present discriminatory pattern under new labels.
Enough has been said to indicate the kinds of problems facing
anyone who tries to draft a statute which would introduce preventive
detention as a substitute for the financially-oriented bail system. Difficulties of this kind may have prompted Mr. Justice Jackson, urged to
deny bail because of alleged danger of the applicant's "anticipated but
as yet uncommitted crimes," to say that "imprisonment to protect
society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented
in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice
that I am loath to resort to it. .

. " 3"

B. The Feasibility of Prediction
Evaluation of the desirability of attempting to predict such
criteria for determining pretrial detention as flight, anticipated serious
criminal conduct, or intimidation of witnesses turns both on our
underlying set of values and on whether or not we possess the knowledge which such predictions would require. This can best be illustrated if we take an example.
We have seen that existing data show a very low incidence of
flight for the purpose of avoiding trial and that there is no reason to
expect that this would be significantly increased by the release of
indigents. 45 Leaning over backwards to overstate the risk, I will
assume that under present conditions the rate of absconding to avoid
trial is one and one-half percent of bailed cases, and then I will double
this rate to allow for any additional risk created by the release of all
indigents. This leaves us with a pretrial defendant population of
which we would expect three percent to try to avoid trial by flight.
In any situation in which the event to be predicted occurs so
infrequently in the population concerned, any attempt to individualize
prediction must start off against very heavy odds. 46 By the simple
expedient of releasing every defendant pending trial, the implied prev. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 282 (Jackson, Circuit Justice, 1950).
supra.
341 See, e.g., Rosen, Detection of Suicidal Patients: An Example of Some Limitations in the Predictionof Infrequent Events, 18 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 397, 402
344 Williamson
345 See p. 1163

(1954)

The low incidence of suicide is in itself a major limitation in the development
of an effective suicide detention device, for in the attempt to predict suicide or
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diction made as to each one that he would not flee would be right
ninety-seven percent of the time. The only way in which individualized prediction could improve upon this success rate would be if
individualization made less than three mistakes out of every one
hundred cases. This is clearly impossible in dealing with the treacherous quicksand of future human conduct, and I will note below some of
the reasons why this is so. Moreover, even if a slight improvement
could be achieved, for example, a reduction to only two mistakes in a
hundred instead of three, it is very questionable as a practical matter
that so slight an improvement would be worth the cost of processing
every case individually. Individual prediction, after all, is expensive
for all concerned-for the state because it requires time for adjudication and assignment of counsel; for the accused because it delays the
decision as to his right to be released promptly after arrest.
All of the criteria which might be used as standards for preventive detention share this characteristic of being statistically infrequent. Probably we know least about the degree of probability
that a defendant during the period of pretrial release will commit a
serious crime. Here we have no data at all, but it is inconceivable
that the probability is higher than five percent and more likely it is
considerably lower. The other criteria noted-that the defendant will
intimidate witnesses or jurors or injure a complainant-are apparently
very rare, statistically well below one percent.
The foregoing probability analysis rests on a value judgment:
that all mistakes in prediction are equally bad, and that it is as unfortunate mistakenly to detain A because of our erroneous assumption
that he would flee as it is mistakingly to release B only to find that he
will abscond. I think this is the proper value judgment to apply, for
it seems to me just as important for the administration of the criminal
law not to lock up an accused unnecessarily as it is not to permit a
defendant to escape trial by flight. But as it seems so obvious that
proceeding upon the assumption of this value judgment leads to rejection of the claim for preventive detention, I am forced to the conclusion that the advocates of preventive detention must make a different
underlying value judgment. It is worthwhile, then, to examine an
alternative value hypothesis.
Let us suppose that the flight of one defendant to avoid trial is
regarded as a more serious occurrence than the erroneous detention of
one defendant who in fact would not have fled if released. We might
any other infrequent event, a large number of false positives are obtained
(patients incorrectly classified as siucides). . . . A suicide detention device
is not feasible until much more is learned about the differential characteristics
of patients who commit suicide.
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paraphrase but reverse another old maxim and conclude that the
prevention of one flight is ten times as important to society as the prevention of one unnecessary detention. We would have to devise a
different method which would allow for this weighting in an evaluation of success or failure of prediction. This could be done by assigning a score of one point for each defendant who does not flee and ten
points for each one who does. Thus in our sample of one hundred
cases, a perfect score would be ninety-seven points for that many
defendants correctly predicted not to flee plus thirty points for three
defendants correctly predicted to flee, or a total of 127 points. Applying this measure to the method of automatic release of every defendant,
we see that its success rate falls sharply: it earns ninety-seven points
(one for each defendant who does not flee) out of the possible total
of 127 points, or only about seventy-six and one-half per cent of
perfection. Thus a competing system of preventive detention which
tries to do better by predicting on an individualized, case-by-case
method faces odds which, while still formidable, are no longer overwhelming. An example of the most favorable kind of result we could
expect from individualized prevention under ideal .conditions might
come out as follows: Eighty-five defendants would be predicted not to
flee, of whom one in fact does flee and eighty-four do not; and fifteen
defendants would be predicted to flee, of whom in fact two flee and
thirteen do not. The evaluation score for this result would be eightyfour (for those correctly predicted not to flee) plus twenty (for the
two cases correctly predicted to flee), a rating of nearly eighty-two
per cent of perfection (104 out of the possible 127 points). Thus
although the method of individualized prevention has made fourteen
mistakes against only three mistakes for automatic release, we might
still prefer it if we make the hypothesized value judgment that one
escape is ten times as serious as one unnecessary detention.
It may be objected that the example just given is not fair to
the method of individualized prevention because we have assigned it
too many mistakes. On the contrary, by assuming it would make
eighty-six correct judgments in one hundred cases we have given it
a success rate probably higher than anything to be expected. In all
areas where prediction of future human conduct has been subjected to
empirical validation the results have proved to be very modest indeed.
The critical part of the foregoing sentence is subjection of all the
results to empirical validation. When we use prediction today in the
criminal law, as in imposing a prison sentence instead of probation or
in granting or withholding parole because of anticipated future dangerousness, the validity of the predictions made are not subjected to
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scientific study; instead the system conceals most of its mistakes. Thus
when a judge or a psychiatrist advising him concludes that a particular defendant poses too great a risk to be released on probation,
the prison sentence which the judge imposes as a result of the prediction prevents any evaluation of its accuracy. The only errors which
show up--and they are ones of which judges and parole boards are
made painfully aware-is where a defendant given probation or parole
turns out to be dangerous. The errors on the other side of the ledgerthe cases of those sent to prison as bad risks but who in fact would not
have proved to be bad risks-are never identified and therefore cannot
be counted. But all experience with the scientific study of prediction
shows that this back side of the moon is where most of the errors will
in fact occur.3 47
What causes this overprediction of a criterion, a phenomenon
which has plagued all efforts at systematic prognosis of future conduct,
can be better understood if we retrace our steps for a moment and put
ourselves in the shoes of the judge who made the predictions of risk
of flight in our last example. We hypothesized a sample of one hundred defendants and an average flight rate of three per cent. The
judge's job, then, is to identify those three, and only those three. In
this real and far from perfect world, the judge is faced at the outset
by two fundamental limitations on his work: the inadequacy of the
347 See, for example, a very recent prediction study of problems closely analogous
to those of pretrial preventive detention: MoLoF, PREDICTION or FUTURE ASSAULTIVE
BEHAViOR AMONG YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS (California Youth Authority, Research Rep.
No. 41, 1965). An actuarial prediction instrument was applied to two samples of male
first parole releases from California institutions, the first consisting of 2,060 cases
and the second of 8,017. Those groups predicted to produce the highest proportions
of assaultive offenders did so to a statistically significant degree, but the number of
false predictions was also so high that "the prediction instruments are neither accurate
nor efficient." Id. at 58. For example, for the score category predicted to produce
and which did produce the highest proportion of assaultive offenders, only 29 out
of 128 offenders so classified in one sample, and 29 out of 334 in the other, actually
turned out to be assaultive offenders; all the rest were false predictions. Id. at 56-57,
Tables 13, 15. Molof's work uses actuarial or statistical prediction techniques. An
analysis of the comparative efficacy of statistical and clinical methods of prediction
in twenty-seven studies in which both methods were used showed that in seventeen
the statistical method was superior, in ten they were about the same, and in none
was clinical prediction superior. See MREHL, CLINICAL v. STATISTICAL PRDICION
83-128 (1954).
Predictions by psychiatrists attempting to assess the probability of future breakdown of army inductees show similar results on evaluation. For example, Berlien
studied 248 World War II inductees who fell in a class usually rejected for service as
risks of becoming psychiatric casualties but who in the instance studied had been inducted. One year later 209 were still in service, 32 had been discharged, five died and
two were commissioned as officers. Berlien, Psychiatric Aspects of Military Manpower
Conservation, 111 AMERIcAN J. PSYCHIATRY 91, 95, Table 4 (1954).
Other studies showing similar results are summarized by GINZBERG, THE INEFFECSee especially a summary
TIVE SOLDIER: THE LOST DMsio s 167, 180-89 (1959).
of a study by Glass based on intensive evaluation and prognosis by six psychiatrists
of 505 Korean war inductees during their basic training. It was predicted that 123
were likely failures as soldiers for psychiatric reasons, but only thirty turned in
unsatisfactory performance; four times as many failures were predicted as subsequently occurred. Id. at 187.
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factual data available to him and the inadequacy of our knowledgewe simply do not know much about the human mechanics which cause
three of our sample, and only three, to decide upon the desperate and
probably self-defeating expedient of flight. Perhaps seventy of our
defendants will be relatively easy to classify as good risks-their
records will not be as bad as the others and as to each there is no
special reason to think they will abscond. Another fifteen or so will
be borderline-they give us a lot of trouble, but they are not as
bad as the worst. As a good judge will be keenly aware of the low
incidence of flight, constantly reminding himself that only three out
of the one hundred are actually likely to flee, he will give these fifteen
the benefit of the doubt and also classify them as good risks. There
is a substantial likelihood, however, that this group of eighty-five so
far granted release from detention will contain one of the three who
will actually flee, an error due either to the omission of critical information from the factual record submitted to the judge or to the vast
unknowns in our knowledge of human conduct. There will remain,
then, fifteen defendants who will be almost indistinguishable from one
another according to any of the standards which the judge might
reasonably guess (because we have little tested knowledge) to be relevant to an assessment of the risk of flight. All of these fifteen will
have prior criminal records, inadequate ties to the community, a
sketchy employment history, and the prospect of probable conviction
and a probable substantial prison sentence. Application of such standards to this group, therefore, will not help the judge to distinguish the
two or three who will flee from the twelve or thirteen who, despite their
equally bad records, will not. This places the judge in a dilemma 38and this is the dilemma of preventive detention. If he decides to select
only three for detention, because he knows from the statistical probabilities that only three will actually flee, he has no method for choosing
these three from the other twelve better than using a pack of cards,
although he may choose to call this process intuition or otherwise
mask what he is doing behind some similar label. If he decides nonetheless to try picking just three, he would avoid the error of a high
rate of unnecessary detention. The trouble with this, of course, is that
348 This problem has been beautifully analyzed by Freud:
Even supposing that we thoroughly know the aetiological factors that decide
a given result, still we know them only qualitatively, and not in their relative
strength. Some of them are so weak as to become suppressed by others, and
therefore do not affect the final result. But we never know beforehand which
of the determining factors will prove the weaker or the stronger. We only
say at the end that those which succeeded must have been the stronger.
Hence it is always possible by analysis to recognize the causation with
certainty, whereas a prediction of it by synthesis is impossible.
Freud, The Psychogenesis of a Case of HomosezMality in a Woman, in 2 CoLLECrED
PTERs 227 (1959).
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he is more likely than not to miss both the two remaining cases of actual flight, while to identify them both would require luck of the order
needed to draw a full house in poker. So I hypothesized instead that
the most reasonable thing for the judge to do would be to detain all
fifteen, which gave us the results noted above. At least the judge has
identified and thereby prevented two out of the three flights-a modestly successful result. If the cost of this success is that he was wrong
about thirteen of the fifteen bad risks whom he detained, this is unavoidable. The only way to reduce this error would also reduce his
chances of identifying even as many as two-thirds of those who in
fact will flee.
As the same analogy applies to other criteria of detention, it is
again apparent that the critical threshold problem in an evaluation of
preventive detention is the judgment of how much to weigh the
mistake of allowing a defendant to flee (or commit a serious crime, or
intimidate a witness) relative to the weight assigned to a mistake
of unnecessary detention. Unless we choose to give the first kind of
mistake much more weight, the case for preventive detention collapses
and we need to proceed no further. Moreover, even if we make the
alternative value judgment that unnecessary imprisonment of the
untried is the much less serious error, it will be recalled that we
postulated ideal conditions for our judge who, in our hypothetical,
achieved eighty-two percent of perfection. In practice the judging
function would be diffused, a process which could only reduce the
effectiveness of prediction. As for the other ideal conditions, these
include the provision of adequate factual data and no delay in achieving
release for the eighty-five percent who are not to be detained. Failure
to meet these ideals would, in the first instance, introduce additional
sources of error, and in the second (delay), increase the cost of preventive detention in terms of its prejudice to defendants.
C. Fact Finding
The method first developed by the Vera Foundation for the
Manhattan Bail Project to provide a rapid method of developing
certain basic factual data in the space of a few hours the morning after
arrest has already been described. 849 That kind of quick check should
prove to be effective for screening out the low risk cases and getting
them out to pretrial release with a minimum of delay. For more
difficult cases-perhaps that half or one-third of the defendant population who are not obvious candidates for immediate release under whatever standards have been adopted-presumably a more thorough factual
349 See Crisis in Bail: I, at 961.
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investigation would be required.3 5 How this might be accomplished
within the time reasonably available may prove to be a very difficult
problem. The more precise the standards for preventive detention are
made, the more will be required of the prosecution to establish a case
for detention, with corresponding increase in the complexity of the
fact finding process.
D. Adjudication and Review
Today there is virtually no hearing on bail issues in the bail setting
process, 51 and we have already examined the total inadequacy of
An acid test for evaluation of proposals
existing judicial review.3
will
be the procedures advanced as remedies
detention
for preventive
for these defects. The principal problems will probably turn on delay,
noted below, the necessary provision of counsel, and the method of
adjudicating facts. Where more than a superficial fact check is required, the type of data typically provided in a presentence report is
what might be desired. Note, however, that (1) the presentence report in present practice requires two or more weeks to prepare, (2) is
based on the information of anonymous informants and is frequently
treated as confidential by the court, and (3) presupposes guilt, so that
the propriety of making this kind of investigation and report before
adjudication is open to serious question. Moreover, if there is to be
a meaningful appeal, it would appear that the original judge or magistrate would have to write an opinion or in some way indicate the
reasons for his decision. If the appellate court receives nothing but
the trial court's conclusions it will have no basis for review, being
"left in a welter of assertion and counter-assertion in affidavits from
which we have no adequate means of emerging." "' Nor will review
become a meaningful reality unless the standards for detention are
narrowly drawn. The kinds of predictions involved in preventive detention are not easily susceptible to close control by an appellate court:
. . . when it is a question of the application of duly recognized standards, and such application turns on what may
fairly be called "facts," or on a necessarily prophetic judgment
like the trustworthiness of a convicted defendant [applying
350 "Of course, the keynote to successful administration of any system of bail
is the adequacy of the information upon which the decisions are based." Pannell v.

United States, 320 F.2d 698, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
351 See Crisis in Bail: I, at 994.
352 See pp. 1130-31 supra.
353 United States v. Hansell, 109 F.2d 613, 614 (2d Cir. 1940) (per curiam).
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for bail pending appeal], I do not conceive it to be the function of a Circuit Justice to exercise an independent
judgment
54
as though he were sitting in the district court.3
E. Delay in Disposition
All of the procedural difficulties suggested above come into sharp
focus if attention is explicitly directed to the problem of delay. It is
self-evident that time is of the essence, and the chief merit of the
present bail system for those who can afford it is that it is usually
able to achieve very rapid release, often without requiring of the
defendant anything more than a few hours of detention. In Philadelphia, of a sample of 368 defendants who had obtained bail after it was
set by a magistrate in preliminary hearing, 297 were released the same
day and twenty-four more on the day next following. 55 In New York
in 1961-1962, of a sample of 372 accused who eventually made bail
356
before trial, 190 or more than half spent no time in jail.
Under a system of preventive detention it is impossible to know
what would happen, but the ingredients for delay exist at every step
of the way. Overloaded, mass production urban courts of first instance,
which have been accustomed to set the amount of bail by rote and
without evidence from a schedule of bail amounts by crimes, will have
to hold real hearings, to wait for the facts, to wait for defense counsel,
and to wait for the prosecution to present its evidence. How fast can a
judicial system work with this kind of problem? Three examples from
other areas of current criminal procedure hardly permit a favorable
prognosis.
The first is the administration of habeas corpus, where the urgency
of achieving a speedy disposition is the very history of the development
of the great writ. The landmark English statute of 1679 is replete
with time limits upon judges and others, with penalties for their
violation. 5
Some of these controls against delay found their way
354 Ward v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 1063, 1066 (Frankfurter, Circuit Justice,
1956). In this case, involving bail pending appeal, Justice Frankfurter was apparently
precluded from any significant appellate function.
[T]he District Judge felt that the likelihood of flight was a danger not to
be disregarded. I cannot reject this conclusion of the District Court because
it was based on confidential probation reports. . . . Such a judgment is, to
be sure, a prophecy but I cannot sit as the district judge and make my own.
Ibid.
Compare United States v. Williams, 253 F.2d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1958), where
the court complains of the "meager record" brought up for review. The district
court gave no reasons for denial of bail, but the court of appeals, denying bail though
remanding for new hearing, said that "We can assume that he had a confidential
probation report before him .

.

.

."

Id. at 148.

355 PhiladelphiaBail Study 1044 n.52.
535 Rankin 643 n.6.
35731 Charles 2, ch.

2.
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into our federal statutory provisions.3 5' Current federal procedure
requires that the judge, unless the petition is invalid on its face, "forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show
cause why the writ should not be granted .

.

.

."

9 In either event,

respondent is to file a return within three days and a hearing on the
merits is to follow within five more days. It is significant that even
under this ideal procedure eight days is felt to be required, and even
more significant that in practice final disposition after hearing is
probably almost never achieved within the eight-day limit. The statute
itself permits additional time for "good cause" at both the return and
hearing stages. Moreover, the rule-to-show-cause device, which was
judicially created and finally authorized by statute in 1948,"'0 serves
as "adilatory plea or demurrer." 361 As federal courts "appear almost
invariably to issue the rule and not the writ," 362 and as there will frequently be a hearing on the rule to show cause before the writ issues and
the case then moves to a hearing on the merits, the typical result is a
three, rather than a two, stage procedure, with ample opportunities for
delay all along the line. In practice, too, it is likely that extensions of
time are the rule rather than the exception apparently envisaged by the
statute "3 and certainly by the history of the writ. While a broadly
based empirical investigation of the administration of habeas corpus in
both federal and state preconviction and postconviction practice is
358 Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat 81, as amended, REv.
STAT.

§§ 751-53 (1875).

359 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1958). In habeas corpus procedure, of course, issuance
of the writ is not a disposition of the petition but merely moves the case to a hearing
on the merits. For a prisoner to win, he must be granted the writ and then obtain
an order for discharge.
3A60Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2243, 62 Stat. 869 (now 28 U.S.C. § 2243
(1958)).
361 Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus: A Proteanr Writ and Remedy, 8 F.R.D. 179, 187
(1949).
62 AMSTERDAm,

THE DFFxs=V

TRANSFER OF CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION FROm

STATE To FEDERAL CouRTs 389 (1965).
363 A study of sixty habeas corpus petitions filed in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1963 showed a time sequence for

ten of the cases that reached the stage of issuance of a rule to show cause. The time
set for the return was thirty days in one case, twenty in a second, and the average
of the remaining eight was nine days; in only two cases was the respondent directed
to answer in the statutory three days. Weiser, An Analysis of the Petitions for Writ
of Habeas Corpus Filed in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by the State Prisoner, February 1964, p. 12 (unpublished paper in Biddle Law
Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School). See also Dorsey v. Gill, 148
F.2d 857, 865-66 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (listing ten alternative procedures for handling

habeas corpus petitions, most of which will delay a disposition on the merits).
The simile of the procedure for and upon the great writ to the behavior of
Proteus is not strained. Just as the suppliant of Proteus has to lay firm hold
on him and cling sturdily until he ceased his apparitional antics . . . ; so
must the applicant for habeas corpus . . . . [be] steadfast and persistent
Longsdorf, supra note 361, at 192.
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needed, it seems probable that delay is also typical in state administration of the writ. 64
The second example is the administration of the preliminary
hearing, which is designed as a control against unjustifiable arrest and
detention. If the hearing is to perform its important exculpatory and
protective function, it should follow arrest as promptly as possible.
But if it does come quickly after arrest, one study has found that it
tends to be superficial and protects the defendant "against only
egregious police error. The principal objection to a more probing
preliminary hearing is that anything more than a superficial showing of
probable cause places an unrealistic burden upon police .... ,"'

in

the time available. It is common knowledge that, in practice, the hearing frequently or usually is continued, and the federal rules provide
that, whereas the appearance before the commissioner for notification
to the accused of his rights must be "without unnecessary delay," "'
the hearing shall occur "within a reasonable time." "' Where defendant has to obtain or be provided with counsel, delay is probably
necessary, and counsel for prosecution frequently ask for a continuance.
The continuance practice is subject to great abuse, defendants may be
subject to pressure to waive the hearing entirely, and the principle
of a prompt independent judicial check on arrests is impaired.
Third, a careful study of the efficacy of appellate review of denial
of bail pending appeal under the discretionary standards now applied
in the federal courts should give us data valuable for our present
purposes.8- 8 This federal system is probably the closest existing
364Thus in Philadelphia, where the statute gives the district attorney up to
twenty days to make his return on an order to show cause, PA. STAT. ANN. tit 12,
§ 1904 (1951), after which the case must be listed, the delay between petition and
hearing is routinely at least two weeks. Letter From Herman I. Pollock, Defender
Association of Philadelphia, to the Author, May 13, 1965.
365 Note, Preliminary Hearings on Indictable Offenses it Philadelphia, 106 U.
PA. L.
REV. 589, 606 (1958).
3 6
6 FED. R. CRir. P. 5 (a).
836FED. R. Clim. P. 5(c). Compare PA. R. CRIm. P. 116, which formally distinguishes between an informative "preliminary arraignment!' and a later "preliminary
hearing" which shall occur "not less than three nor more than ten days" later "unless
extended for cause shown .

. .

."

For an attempt to limit the period of delay, see

ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §43 (1931) (no single postponement for more
than two days, and all postponements combined not to exceed six days).
368 See FED. R. Citm. P. 46(a) (2): "Bal may be allowed pending appeal or
certiorari unless it appears that the appeal is frivolous or taken for delay." For
the purpose of this rule "frivolous" has the same meaning as not taken in "good faith"
for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1958) (proceedings in forma pauperis). According to Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958) (per curiam), not taken
in "good faith" and "frivolous" mean issues "so frivolous that the appeal would be
dismissed in the case of a nonindigent litigant .

.

.

."

For the application of this

doctrine in bail cases see, e.g., Barnard v. United States, 309 F2d 691 (9th Cir. 1962).
The use of the word "may" in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a) (2)
has been construed to permit the court to deny bail even if the appeal is not frivolous
or taken for delay. See Ward v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 1063 (Frankfurter,
Circuit Justice, 1956).
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analogue to proposals for preventive detention. To the extent that
published reports give information about the time required to process
an appeal from denial of bail they suggest that delays from a few days
370
to up to a week are routine," 9 that much longer delays are frequent,
and that a very common tactic is for the appellate court, instead of
deciding yes or no on the right to bail, to remand the case back to
the district court for further hearing-a procedure sure to entail added
delay. 1 Judge Yankwich has reported the history of five cases in
Los Angeles where to appeal a denial of bail "[all] you had to do
was to find a [circuit] judge on the Sixteenth Floor of the same building .

...

,"37

The interval in days elapsing between the denial of

the appeal in these cases in the district court and the filing in the
district court of the appellate order to release on bail was: four days,
ten days, fifteen days, seventeen days and thirty-two days. 73
Taken together, experience with these comparable proceedings
gives no reason for optimism that it would be possible to develop
369 E.g., Tinmons v. United States, 343 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1965)

(per curiam)

(appeal against denial of bail argued January 5, decided January 28) ; United States
v. Galente, 290 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1961) (per curiam) (appeal on bail filed May 18,
argued May 23 and denied June 1, in case where twenty day contempt sentence was
running); United States v. Esters, 161 F. Supp. 203 (W.D. Ark.), aff'd, 255 F.2d 63
(8th Cir. 1958) (per curiam) (bail denied in district court April 12, appeal decided
April 29). Of course the overwhelming majority of appellate court decisions in bail
cases are probably not reported, and an empirical study of time taken in these unreported decisions would be useful.
370 For particularly egregious examples see the history of the Bandy case, note
274 supra, and the long litigation involving bail for one Sica. Sica, along with his
co-defendant Carbo, was engaged in repeated appeals in the federal courts before his
conviction was finally upheld on the merits sub norn. Carbo v. United States, 314
In February, 1961
F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
Sica's bail was revoked during his trial; the revocation was reversed, 288 F.2d 282
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 861 (1961); on remand bail was denied on new
grounds and this affirmed, 288 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1961). After conviction on May 30
and sentence on December 2, Sica continued in jail, the district court denying bail
pending appeal on grounds that his release would endanger government witnesses.
The court of appeals remanded the denial of bail on January 22, 1962, holding that
potential harm to witnesses was not justification for denying bail pending appeal.
300 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1962). The district court again refused release, resting denial
on the ground that bail would not be a sufficient deterrent to flight. The court of
appeals affirmed on February 13, 302 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1962) (per curiam), although
the court decided that it would be "appropriate that the appeals be expedited." Id.
at 457. Thirteen months after bail was first denied Sica obtained an order for bail
from Justice Douglas. 82 Sup. Ct. 669 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962) ; cf. Carbo v.
United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 662 (Douglas, Circuit Justice), application for review
denied, 369 U.S. 868 (1962) (denying release to Sica's codefendant). The "expedited"
appeal was decided after another year, 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 953 (1964). The case is an apt illustration of the kind of procedural runaround
made possible by ill-defined standards for denial of bail, and is the more significant
because Sica had highly skilled counsel throughout these proceedings.
3t E.g., Hairston v. United States, 343 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam)
(applied to court of appeals for reduction of bail on December 5, district court ordered
to file opinion explaining setting of high bail and opinion filed December 31, decided
February 2).
372 Yankwich, Release on Bond by Trial and Appellate Courts, 7 F.R.D. 271,
277, 278-79 (1948).
373 Id. at 278-79.
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procedures for adequate hearing on preventive detention and administer them with sufficient dispatch to avoid serious complications.
The volume of cases, the low calibre of judicial officers typically
assigned at this stage of proceedings, and the added complication of
having to build in some method of expeditious review all indicate that
it would be administratively impossible to create a system that for
many defendants, who would be promptly bailed today and would ultimately achieve release under preventive detention, would avoid some
days of detention before the right to pretrial release could be adjudicated. It is worth recalling that our hypothetical defendant was
fired from his job after failing to show up on two successive days.
Pretrial detention is a situation where it is particularly true that
justice delayed is justice denied.
V. CONCLUSION
1. From the analysis of equal protection I conclude that extension
of the Griffin rule to bail is particularly appropriate, and that pretrial
detention of an accused who would go free but for differences in
financial circumstances is a violation of the equal protection clause. As
is now required with appeals, the government should be required to
control the problems of the pretrial period by methods which do not
result in invidious distinctions in the treatment of rich and poor.
2. From the analysis of the eighth amendment the only interpretation which seems to me consistent with its historical antecedents
and what must have been its purpose is to find in it protection from
pretrial detention which is secured against abridgment by legislation
or the vagaries of judicial discretion. The words "excessive bail" in
the amendment must be given an interpretation consistent with the
Griffin rule as forbidding any financial discrimination against the
accused. Such an interpretation pierces the literal guarantee and
focuses upon the fundamental interests with which the amendment is
concerned: the right not to be punished before conviction and the right
not to be prejudiced in preparing for trial. These were the ends; a
financial bonding system was merely a means, perhaps suited to an
earlier age, but at any rate now obsolete and offensive to current
values.3 74 The concept of excessiveness would continue to be pertinent
as a check against the imposition of unjustifiably onerous conditions of
pretrial release.
374 Compare the judicial response to the new morality implicit in changing concepts of race relations: "In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back
to 1868 when the [fourteenth] Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy
v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full
development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation." Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
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Construed as embodying the fundamental protection of the accused
during preconviction procedure, the amendment is restored to the role
it must have been intended to fill as a part of the basic charter of our
liberties. Those parts of the Bill of Rights which are today interesting
only as historical curiosities-for example the third amendment on
quartering soldiers-have become relics because the subjects with
which they dealt are no longer problems. But the eighth amendment
does not deserve such a fate, for the issues with which it is concerned
are as alive and important today as in 1789. Where we have a specific
provision which, given a reasonable interpretation, deals satisfactorily
with today's manifestations of the problem concerned, it seems far
better to use that provision than to load pretrial detention problems
upon the already overburdened and not very secure shoulders of due
process.

37 5

An eighth amendment given its proper role as an integral and
important part of our basic rights should also be incorporated in the
fourteenth amendment and made applicable to the states. Indeed, I
have assumed throughout that such incorporation exists, although the
question has not been authoritatively decided. 70 Other collateral
problems would then have to be resolved, for example, the express
exception historically provided for capital cases and possible application
of the amendment to bail after conviction pending appeal. 377 The first
problem contains difficult questions at a time when offenses declared
capital by legislation remain common but the actual imposition of
the death penalty is declining rapidly. The appeal problem is simpler
and the proper answer seems to me self-evident. The question did
not arise when the rights embodied in the eighth amendment were
being forged simply because "the criminal appeal can be regarded
almost [as] a modern innovation" which was "very largely a product
375 Compare Mr. Justice Black's protest in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
177 (1952) (concurring opinion) : "Of even graver concern, however, is the use of
the [due process] philosophy to nullify the Bill of Rights. I long ago concluded that
the accordian-like qualities of this philosophy must inevitably imperil all the individual
liberty safeguards specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights."
376 Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502 (1915), which held that the eighth amendment did not apply to the states was a cruel and unusual punishment case and on that
clause was overruled (without being cited) by Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962). Recent cases in dictum and without authority have assumed incorporation
of the excessive bail clause in the fourteenth amendment. Mastrian v. Hedman, 326
F.2d 708, 711 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964) ; Dye v. Cox, 125 F. Supp.
714, 715 (E.D. Va. 1954) (incorporation assumed); People ex rel. Schildhaus v.
Warden, 37 Misc. 2d 660, 672, 235 N.Y.S.2d 531, 546 (Sup. Ct. 1962). The most
recent examples of the march to incorporate the Bill of Rights in the fourteenth
amendment are Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment right of
confrontation applies to states) ; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment guarantee against self-incrimination applies to the states); cf. Griffin v. California, 85 Sup. Ct. 1229 (1965).
377 1 intend to examine these questions in a subsequent article.
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of the nineteenth century." 78 As appeal has now become an integral
part of the judicial process in criminal cases, the same constitutional
protection should be applied pending appellate disposition as prior to
conviction, a result dictated not only by the logic of the eighth amendment, but also by unsatisfactory experience with discretionary power
to deny bail pending appeal.
3. From the analysis of the very substantial prejudice which results from pretrial detention contrasted with the at best conjectural
value of the bail system in supporting the incidence of appearance for
trial, I conclude that detention is consistent with the due process
demand of fundamental fairness only in situations of extraordinary
risk. In most cases, if whatever security bail may provide were removed, no alternative protection against absconding would be required
beyond the provision of sanctions for wilful flight and existing knowledge by the accused that flight will prejudice him at sentencing.
In high risk cases alternatives available to the government should
suffice to provide for essential public interests. These alternatives
include speedy trial at the discretion of the government, with the
possibility of detention as a sanction for unjustifiable delaying tactics
by the defendant; probation control over the accused, daily reporting
to the police or restrictions on travel; and discretion to detain an
accused who has absconded in the instant or in a prior recent case
(perhaps within five years). Only where the government can establish that release would create a high risk of violent injury to a specific
victim, complainant, or witness should detention be permitted as a
preventive measure. Even then detention should be contingent upon a
speedy trial, and conditions of confinement should permit defendants
to communicate freely with counsel, family and friends, and provide
them with a standard of living substantially better than that of sentenced prisoners. Default by the government in meeting these conditions in any case should abrogate its privilege to detain.
4. The analysis of preventive detention leads me to its rejection
except in the very limited situation just noted. If my constitutional
analysis is accepted, this result is compelled; but even if preventive
detention is held not to be constitutionally proscribed, it should be rejected on policy grounds. The addition of the label "preventive" does
not cleanse detention of its vices: pretrial punishment and impairment
of a fair trial. The overwhelming objection to such detention is that
the kinds of precise prediction of future conduct which it requires can378 Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedants and Aftermath, 25 U. CHi. L. REv. 151,
154 (1957).
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not be made with significant reliability even under the best of fact
finding and diagnostic circumstances. As it would have to be administered on a mass scale before the lowest level judiciary with no
practical possibility of fast and effective appellate review, it would
deteriorate into the worst kind of uncontrolled discretion.
The impossibility of individualized preventive prediction in this
area and the statistical demonstration that the least number of mistakes
will be made by releasing everyone is a convincing modem vindication
of the wisdom of the absolute right to bail which has been an important
part of our history since the Massachusetts Body of Liberties in 1641.
5. As for the hypothetical defendant, he should be released on
recognizance pending his trial. Even if he is in fact innocent, he may
be unable to find his witnesses, or get them to testify, or if they take
the stand the jury may refuse to believe them. But a system of justice
which is inevitably going to make some mistakes should have an
easier conscience if it has given him at least this much chance to
defend himself.
It is also quite possible that the defendant's alibi and his witnesses may be nothing more than figments of a lying imagination. In
this event, if he is released he may try to manufacture witnesses and
produce a perjured defense. He may, in the common usage which
reveals the extent of our prejudgment, "repeat his crime." Or he may
abscond, either because he knows he is guilty or because he knows he
is innocent but doubts that a jury could be so persuaded. Still another
conceivable, if unlikely, result is that he would abuse pretrial freedom
by doing harm to the informer, Inman, against whom he has expressed some resentment.
The weighing of such imponderables, whose probability cannot be
determined, against the possibility of injustice to the accused, a risk
whose magnitude is unknown, poses for adjudication on an individual
case-by-case basis an impossible task. For the class of accused criminals of which the hypothetical defendant is a member, however, we
either know or could discover what these probabilities are. On the
one hand, perhaps a quarter of defendants like him will not be convicted; on the other hand, fair estimates are that the statistical incidence of attempted flight followed by ultimate rearrest is small, of
permanently successful escape far smaller, and of the other risks, so
small as to be statistically insignificant. The genius of specifically
enumerated Bill of Rights guarantees such as the eighth amendment
is that they make policy equally applicable to all members of a class,
instead of succumbing to the seductive delusion that by prediction in
individual cases one can reduce the total number of errors.
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6. At first blush there appear to be substantial disadvantages for
the government in the position which is here taken both as constitutional exegesis and as the wisest resolution of the bail problem. In the
long run, however, my conclusion is that the government's administration of criminal law is less likely to be harmed than benefited from
the abolition of pretrial detention.
The possible losses are immediately apparent. To an unknown
but perhaps significant extent the government would be deprived of
some advantages it now derives from pretrial detention, for example,
detention's contribution to the present high rate of guilty pleas, or
the government's superior negotiating position in plea bargaining with
jailed defendants. Such advantages, however, are illegitimate and are
exacted in a discriminatory fashion only from the poor. If there were
to be a significant decrease in the proportion of guilty pleas and a
corresponding increase in the proportion of those going to trial, a
problem with which we are already familiar as a result of provision
of assistance of counsel for all defendants, the pressure for additional
facilities to deal with criminal administration would increase. But
there is no escape from the fact that more equal justice for the indigent
is going to impose new and heavy burdens on the state.
Such burdens can, however, have advantages as well. Increased
pressure might promote greater efficiency in prosecution, especially in
early screening of cases. It might speed the urgently needed reexamination of the role of the criminal law in conjunction with
possibly increased reliance on other noncriminal sanctions and controls.
Every stage of the criminal process from the police lockup to the
penitentiary is now loaded with unnecessary cases: for example, we use
arrest where summons would suffice, fail to screen out cases efficiently
early in the prosecution process, fail fully to utilize probation and
parole, and apply criminal sanctions where they are inappropriate or
unnecessary. Thus Packer has persuasively argued that the time has
come "to reexamine the uses now being made of the criminal sanction
with a view toward deciding which uses are relatively indispensible
and which might with safety (and perhaps even with some net gain
to the public welfare) be restricted or relinquished." 379
Very sharp curtailment of pretrial detention would bring many
compensating advantages, for example, vast savings in present high
detention costs, reduced exposure to county jail life (aptly characterized as training in crime), and probably an increased incidence
of probation as previously detained defendants would be in a better
position to qualify for it. More subtle, but perhaps even more sig379

Packer, Two Models of the CriminalProcess, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 67 (1964).
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nificant, would be a change in the image the law presents to the
economically depressed levels of our population. Equal justice should
be more than charity for the poor; it should build that respect for law
which in the last analysis is the only secure foundation for effective
enforcement.
If these conclusions about bail appear to be strong medicine,
disrupting the familiar and entailing risks which are probably magnified in our imagination because they are unknown, then to that
extent the bail crisis will force us to probe again what we really mean
by due process and equal justice. It will also test the quality of our
democracy, for, as has been repeatedly observed, a revealing measure
of any civilization is found in its treatment of citizens accused of
crime and-I would add-of those crippled by poverty in the adversary
struggle with the state.

